50.Имея в виду...
With this in mind...
51.Среди участников дискуссии были...
Among those who took part in the discussion were...
52.В результате дискуссии, которую вы провели...
As a result of the discussion you have held...
53.И что примечательно, ваша дискуссия показала, что...
And it is remarkable that your discussion has shown...
54.Более того, ваша дискуссия показывает, что...
Moreover your discussion shows...
55.I'm deeply convinced that...
Я глубоко убежден, что...
56.Общие вопросы вызвали много комментариев.
The general considerations provided a rich harvest of comments.
57. Основной вывод из прошедшей дискуссии может быть
сформулирован в таких предложениях...
The main conclusion to be drawn from the discussions
presented can be summarized in the following propositions...
58. Я, естественно, приветствую эти предложения. I naturally welcome these recommendations.
VII. Образцы доклада и тезисов
Stalin, Мао, and the New Democracy in China
The conventional view of the early years of the People's Republic of China, shared by Chinese, Western, and Russian historiography, is that of a division of this epoch into two very distinctive periods - that of so-called "new democracy" or "bourgeois-democratic revolution" (1949-1953) and that of "socialist construction along the Soviet lines" (1953-1959). The division implies that until 1953, Mao and the Maoists tried their best to implement their own tactics and strategy, which
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were different from the Soviet ones. They took into account the fact that China was more backward than Russia and therefore was not ready for Socialism. Hence, the process of stalinization, i.e., the implementation of the Stalinist totalitarian model of political, social, and economic transition, commenced in China sometime in 1953. Some Scholars even argue that the rapid end of the new democratic phase was "unexpected". Oth ers point out that it is still difficult to understand "exactly why" the Chinese in 1953 chose the Soviet model.
At first sight this understanding appears to conform to the historical facts. The CCP indeed came to power not under the banner of socialism, communism, or Stalinism. The party ap pealed to national, rather than social concerns of its country men. During the Anti-Japanese War of 1937-1945 and the socalled Third Civil War of 1946-1949, which the CCP waged against its historic opponent, the Guomindang (the Chinese Nationalist Party, GMD), the CCP abandoned its image of a political organization based on the principles of the "class struggle" and "proletarian internationalism". It did not seek a radical proletarian revolution, but rather social reforms along the lines of the late Chinese President Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People. Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), the famous patriot and democrat, the prominent revolutionary and the fa ther of the Chinese Republic, strove for the national liberation of China. His principles included Nationalism, Democracy, and People's Livelihood (the latter indicating various social and economic programs that would benefit the majority of people.) The CCP gave a liberal interpretation of Sun Yat-sen's ideas, promising to guarantee private ownership and to stimulate na tional private business, to protect the domestic market and to attract foreign investments only under strict state control, to lower fakes and to develop a multi-party system, to organize a coalition government and to maintain democratic freedoms.
This doctrine of the "new democracy", as Mao Zedong
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claimed, differed from the "old Western democracy" since it was carried out under the leadership of the Communist Party. Mao set forth the new line in December 1939 in his article "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" and then in January 1940 in his brochure, "On New Democ racy". He then developed it in a number of subsequent writ ings, including his famous speech at the Seventh Party Con gress of April-June 1945, "On Coalition Government".
In their struggle against the Guomindang the Communists relied on the Chinese democratic tradition. It would be a great mistake to suppose that in the first half of the twentieth century China was a country without a democratic tradition. Many factors stimulated the substantial renovation of Chinese politi cal culture. Among them are the victory of the antimonarchical Xinhai revolution of 1911-1912, the promulgation of the Republic on January 1, 1912, the adoption of the 1912 Constitution, the election to the first Parliament and the parlia mentary debates, the 1915 opposition to Sun Yat-sen's succes sor. President Yuan Shi-kai, and Yuan's plans for monarchical restoration, the collaboration and competition between the CCP and the GMD within the first united front of 1924-1927, the student and labor movement, and, finally, the declaration of the "new democracy". The "New Culture" movement of 1915, the anti-imperialist "May 4th" movement of 1919, the "debate about Socialism" of 1918— 1922, and the anti-Japanese "De cember 9th" movement of 1935 also strengthened the demo cratic inclination of the Chinese intelligentsia. Many of the in tellectuals were extremely active in the political and ideologi cal struggle, and it was this part of the population that enthusi astically followed Mao Zedong's "new democracy".
In sharp contrast, during the Anti-Japanese War Guomin dang leader Chiang Kai-shek adhered to a tough etatist inter pretation of Sun Yat-sen's ideas. He declared it necessary to as sert state control over the economy, and over private owner
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ship, to promote, the collectivization of agriculture, to strengthen the GMD political monopoly, and to persecute dis sidents. These views alienated the liberals, and the GMD ulti mately found itself isolated.
The CCP managed to take advantage of the situation and unite all non-Guomindang liberal forces. During the civil war the Guomindang was totally defeated, and by the end of 1949, the CCP took over mainland China. On September 30, 1949, the Communists organized a multi-party Coalition Govern ment, and on October 1 Mao Zedong proclaimed the People's Republic of China. For the next three years the PRC remained a "new democratic" state. It is true that it maintained especially friendly relations with the Soviet Union and its satellites; it vigorously opposed Western imperialism and fought against United Nations' troops in Korea during the war of 1950-1953. But it is also true, that in this period, at least formally, the PRC did not copy the Stalinist totalitarian model.
These are all well-known facts. The question of new de mocracy, however, is not as simple as it may have seemed. Im portant documents found in the former secret Soviet archives shed new light on this issue. The opening of these depositories and those of the International Communist movement (Comin tern and Cominform) have created a new documentary base for a study of the Chinese Communist movement. In particular, access to the voluminous Stalin files shortly after the collapse of the USSR in 1991 laid the foundation for renewed scholarly inquiry into this topic. These files are now preserved in the State Archives of Social and Political History (RGASPI in Russian abbreviation). A substantial part of the relevant docu ments can be also found in the Archives of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF) and in the archives of the Center of Contemporary Documentation (TsSD). A few months ago RGASPI also began to receive Stalin's documents from the top secret Archives of the President of the Russian
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Federation. Apart from the Stalin collections, invaluable mate rials on the subject, are preserved in the files of other top So viet party officials such as Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Anastas I. Mikoyan, Kliment Ye. Voroshilov, Solomon A. Lozovsky, and Andrei Ya. Vyshinsky, of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) delegation to the Comintern Executive (ECCI), and of the Cominform. Personal dossiers of the members of the CCP, of the Soviet Communists, and of the Comintern Executive Com mittee and Cominform employees are also interesting. So are the files of the Bolshevik Party Central Committee Interna tional Department and of Georgii M. Dimitrov's Secretariat, Access to the latter, however, has been recently denied again, but in the brief period of openness one of us enjoyed working with them extensively.
The collections mentioned above contain records of Sta lin's meetings with Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai; Stalin's correspondence with Mao; other Chinese and Soviet correspondence; Mikoyan's coded telegrams from China about his conversations with CCP leaders; diplomatic mail; as well as various information, from the Soviet intelligence service (OGPU-MGB), including Russian translations of foreign dip lomatic letters intercepted by OGPU-MGB Foreign Depart ment INO OGPU-MGB).
A portion of the documents has recently appeared in seven collections. The first one was published by a group of Ameri can and Russian scholars, the second one by the Giangiacomo Feltrinelli Foundation and the RGASPI, the third one by the Russian Sinologist Sergei L.Tikhvinsky, three others by the Woodrow Wilson Center Cold War International History Proj ect in Washington, DC, and the last by the Russian diplomat Andrei M. Ledovsky.
As for Chinese archival depositories, most of them are still closed to outsiders. Some relevant documents, however, have recently appeared in a number of publications that have
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