come out in the PRC. Among these publications the most es sential is the third volume of The Biographical Chronicle of Mao Zedon. The recent book by Chen Jian on the origin of the Korean War also provides extremely valuable information from the Chinese Communist Party Archives. The published writings of CCP top officials, such as Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and others are of great importance as well. The collection of Mao Zedong Works Since the Foundation of the PRC is particularly worthy mentioning.
Additional data can be found in memoirs of various So viet, Chinese. American, and East European party and state of ficials, including those of Nikolai T. Fedorenko, Lazar M. Ka ganovich, Anastasia I. Kartunova, Nikita S. Khrushchev, Kon stantin C. Koval, Ivan V. Kovalev, Ledovsky, Mikoyan, Molotov, Sergei L. Tikhvinsky, Peter P. Vladimirov (Vlasov), Bo Yibo, Hu Qiaomu, Shi Zhe, Wu Xiuquan, Peter S. Deri abin, Harrison Forman, Milovan Djilas, and some others. The Dimitrov diaries and the diaries of Soviet Ambassador to China Vasilii V. Kuznetov are also extremely useful.
The available documents demonstrate conclusively that Mao's "new democratic" policy in no way contradicted the general course of the world communist movement directed by Stalin himself. The "new democratic" policy of the CCP was in total agreement with the "people's democratic" shift of interna tional Communism as a whole.
This shift took place during and after the Seventh Comin tern Congress of 1935. It was then that Stalin began to antici pate a real Nazi menace to the Soviet Union. It was the primary reason he started to change Communist tactics as he sought al lies among the democratic nations. Needless to say, in his arm chair calculations he was far from abandoning his strategic goal of the ultimate Communist conquest of the world. He was simply engaging in maneuvers that, in essence, were aimed at trying to deceive the West. During World War II Stalin even
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dissolved the Comintern. According to Yugoslav Communist Milovan Djilas' memoirs, the idea of dissolving the Comintern Tirst arose "around the time the Baltic states were joining the Soviet Union", i.e., around 1940. Here is what Stalin himself revealed in 1944: "The situation with the Comintern was be coming more and more abnormal. Here is Vyacheslav Mik hailovich [Molotov, Stalin's commissar of foreign affairs] and I were racking our brains, while the Comintern was pulling in its own direction - and the discord grew worse". It was deception that constituted the foundation of Stalin's "people's democ racy", and in his private talks with his comrades-in-arms the Bolshevik leader made no secret of it. As Djilas recalled:
The substance of his suggestions was, on the one hand, that we ought not to "frighten" the English, by which he meant that we ought to avoid anything that might alarm them into thinking that a revolution was going on in Yugoslavia or an attempt at Communist control. "What do you want with red stars on your caps? The form is not important but what is gained, and you — red stars by God, stars aren't necessary!" Stalin exclaimed angrily.
At the same time this policy also had some additional di mensions. It would definitely facilitate the Communists' take over of their own countries after the war. In their capacity as national "democratic" parties the Communist organizations could most likely establish their hegemony over a relatively broad coalition of anti-imperialist nationalist forces. Following the Comintern's bitter and frustrated struggle against the na tional bourgeoisie in Western and Eastern countries, this shift in Stalin's policy signified international communism's return to Lenin's policy of the united front, which was set forth by the founder of the Comintern in 1920. After all, Stalin would only benefit from the triumph of his satellites.
While seeking victory, nevertheless, he could be quite cautious regarding its results. As a Russian National Commu nist Stalin must have worried about the future emergence of
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new mighty centers of Communist power. A Communist Yugoslavia or even more plausibly a Communist China, which would implement the same Soviet model of a short-cut eco nomic modernization by dictatorial means, might create a challenge to his hegemony over the Communist world. Limit ing the ambitions of foreign Communists to the "democratic" tasks of their own indigenous revolutions, Stalin hence bound them to himself and subordinated their policy to his.
Finally, we cannot underestimate either Stalin's dogmatic approach to Marxist historical materialism. According to Sta lin's views basically expressed in his History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course (Mos cow, 1938), the length of a path to Socialism depended on a level of socio-economic development of a particular country after the Communist takeover. Hence, the less economically advanced countries would have to go through a much longer preliminary period than would Russia before getting to Social ism. This period would resemble the Soviet New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s. Even if Stalin himself as well as - his close confederates were indeed much more radical in their practices than they were in theory, they still fanatically ob served some kind of sacramental religious ritual awhile preaching how to achieve socialism.
When WWII ended in 1945 the first factor that determined Stalin's shift - the existence of the anti-fascist coalition - no longer prevailed. The Communist, takeovers in a number of countries in subsequent years also invalidated the second fac tor. Stalin's fear of multi-polar Communist world, however, and his adherence to theoretical dogmas did not disappear, but rather actually increased.
All these factors affected the CCP. It is noteworthy that the idea of dissolving the Comintern first occurred to Stalin right at the time when Mao Zedong was expounding his "new democratic" ideas. Was this a mere coincidence? Apparently
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not. In his conversations with Stalin's confederate Mikoyan in February 1949 Mao Zedong acknowledged that he had based his own ideas on Stalin's conclusions regarding the nature of the Chinese revolution. Stalin kept a close eye on the develop ment of events in China. He had his own secret informers even in the ranks of the CCP Politburo, and could more or less ef fectively influence the Chinese Communist leadership. Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders, on their own, consistently fa miliarized him with their plans and intentions, regularly con sulting with Moscow. "Comrade chief master," - that is how Mao Zedong called Stalin in his code telegrams to Moscow right after the war. Was it simply a diplomatic gesture on the part of a skilled political leader? It was not only that! Mao per fectly understood that his own struggle for power in China could be successful only if the CCP had Soviet military and economic support. Therefore, it was necessary that he be ex tremely loyal to Stalin, whose suspicious nature was known. That is why, for example, in his telegram of August 28, 1948, while describing to Stalin the issues he would like to discuss with him during his future visit to the Soviet Union, Mao de clared: "We should come to agreement in order to make our political course totally in line with that of the USSR". As he did with the Yugoslavian Communist leaders in 1944, Stalin also periodically cooled off Mao's true communist excitement. Strange as it may seem, documentary evidence indicates that during the official struggle for New Democracy Mao Zedong was more rigid than Stalin. With respect to New Democracy he was even reluctant or negative, but still continued to follow the New Democratic course in order to placate the Moscow leader.
It was Stalin rather than Mao, who tried to show that the CCP had allegedly distanced itself from the Bolshevik party. Moscow refused to receive the head of the CCP until the Peo ple's Republic of China was proclaimed. Stalin did so in spite of Mao's desire to visit him so as he did not want to welcome
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the guerilla leader and give the West a pretext to declare Mao "a Soviet agent." Instead he sent Mikoyan on a secret mission to the Chinese Communist headquarters in Xibaipo in Hebei, to discuss the most important issues. Among these issues there was one that dealt with the nature of the future New Demo cratic power in China. Here is wrhat Mao Zedong wrote about it in his November 30, 1947 telegram to Stalin: "In the period of the final victory of the Chinese revolution, following the ex ample of the USSR and Yugoslavia, all political-parties except the CCP. should leave the political scene, which significantly strengthen the Chinese-revolution". This thesis apparently contradicted what Mao himself wrote in his On Coalition Gov ernment. Moreover, it opposed the entire course of New De mocracy, which aimed at creating a multi-party system in China. Stalin responded in a telegram of April 20, 1948 in which he said:
- We do not agree with this. We think that the various opposition parties in China which represent the middle strata of the Chinese population and are opposing the Guomindang clique will exist for a long time. And the CCP will have to involve them for cooperation against the Chinese reactionary forces and imperialist powers, while keeping hegemony, i.e., the leading position, in its hands. It is possible that some representatives of these parties will have to be included in the Chinese people's democratic government and the government itself has to be proclaimed a coalition government in order to widen the base of this government among the population and to isolate imperialists and their Guomindang agents. It is necessary to keep in mind that the Chinese government in its policy will be a national revolutionary-democratic government, not a Communist one, after the victory of the People's Liberation Armies in China, at any rate in the period immediately after the victory, the length of which is difficult to define now.
Stalin then further elaborated this idea, pointing out that
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