Yun, Deng Xiaoping, and Bo Yibo, in which he said that he saw no reason behind the government's, desire to stimulate pri vate enterprise. The Tax Law, a mistake, in the opinion of Mao Zedong, became an excuse for a vigorous ideological and po litical campaign against the "marketers" and generally anyone opposed to Mao Zedong's policy.
By the summer of 1953, this campaign became particu larly sharp. It concluded the previous ideological debates. The developments had been stimulated by the death of Stalin in March 1953. Mao, who should have seen Stalin as a political rival jealous of the PRC's "successes" in economic construction and at times a hindrance to Mao's own attempts at speeding up the revolutionary transformation, i.e., real stalinization of China, could breathe more easily now. The campaign culmi nated in All-China Conference on financial and economic work that took place in Beijing from June 13 through August 12. Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Bo Yibo had to engage in selfcriticism. Zhou Enlai backed Mao. Mao Zedong imposed his views on the CCP. "Socialist construction along the Soviet lines" officially commenced.
Stalin's totalitarian model would inspire Mao right up to the Eighth CCP congress in 1956. Shortly after that, however, he would consider the Soviet model not so radical and the So viet pace of economic construction not so fast. He would at tempt to reach Communism via the Great Leap Forward. At that point, on could speak not about stalinization rather about the maoization of China.
Вестн. Моск. ун-та. Cep. 13, Востоковедение. 2001. № 2.
Values in Nature
In the short space at my disposal, I should like to convince you that values have a reality in the natural world, that this re ality is to a large extent independent of human concerns, and
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consequently that a modified Aristotelian approach, which I shall briefly sketch, is the most appropriate to a general theory of values. What are the considerations that lead us in that di rection?
1.Aesthetics, psychology, sociology, and religion are dif ficult to conceive without some acknowledgment of values, but the reality of values is perhaps most evident in connection with ethics. If the world were impervious to value, no good or harm could come to it and no action or behavior or motive on any one's part could be good or bad in itself or in its consequences. Being indifferent to value, our actions would fail to be praise worthy or blameworthy, right or wrong, and hence no ethical judgments would be applicable, since ethical actions are valueaffecting. But ethical judgments and behavior do exist (no one can consistently affirm that the contrary ought to be main tained, for to do so is to produce an ethical judgment while in sisting on their non-existence). Hence values exist.
2.Although ethics presupposes values, it would be a mis take to restrict the domain of values to ethics. Ethics considers values only from the perspective of human actions and obliga tions, yet values exist independently of this context. It is good that the sun shines, bad that the hurricane destroys, regardless of whether I can or ought to cause or prevent these phenomena.
3.Indeed we must go further. Values occur not only inde pendently of human actions and obligations; they are also in dependent of any human concern. It would be highly arbitrary to say that suffering is bad and health good for a human being and then deny that these have value for a cat or dog. Yet this is what interest theories of value, sociological accounts, rational istic theories, and linguistic interpretations of, say, the lan guage of imperatives seem to do. These are unduly tied to the conceptualization and articulate expression of values. The dog's and cat's values (not to mention those of an inarticulate human being) are left out because they do not reflect upon
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them, speak in civil tongue about them, or answer question naires concerning them.
4. Nor can values be reduced to desires, or to needs, or to the realm of consciousness. Desires and needs are each too nar row because the values of either one are not broad enough to encompass those of the other or ethical values. Conscious val ues are too narrow because they exclude unconscious condi tions which are similar in structure and which merge with them, as I shall argue shortly, making possible a normative be haviorism concerned with the evaluative description of public behavior. (Of course we need not go to the opposite extreme of denying the reality of consciousness and its own peculiar set of values.)
5. Ethics, human interests, desires, needs, and conscious feelings are each too narrow to characterize a general concept of value. Yet they are value phenomena, species of value facts, naturally occurring in our world. One need not conclude with G. E. Moore or Plato that values are non-natural properties or entities because of any specific kind one can significantly ask, is it good or not? This only shows that "value" and "good" are highly abstract concepts covering multiple types of value and value perspectives such that what is of value from one per spective may be of questionable value from another. Pursuit of a particular pleasure may be injurious to health, your happiness may sometimes conflict with mine, and the achievement of an aesthetic value could be ethically deplorable. Eternal or non natural values and standards there may be, but whether or not this is the case, values have a home in our world and must, if our actions in this world are to have ethical significance.
6. Something like Aristotle's theory of final causation of fers, I think, a suitably broad and naturalistic basis for under standing values including their pluralistic, relativistic, and be havioristic facets. But ideological theories of nature like his currently experience rough sledding in the face of charges that
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they are a primitive holdover from a more animistic or anthro pomorphic era. If the anthropomorphic charge could be made to stick, a teleological theory of value could still survive for a reduced domain of human reality or consciousness, which is admitted to be teleologically structured whether the rest of na ture is, or not. This position of anthropocentric value theorists is, I suggest, an arbitrary restriction upon the domain of teleo logical behaviour and value. Even if true, however, it would not negate what I have to say about the morphology or struc ture of value, but would differ as to the range of its applicabil ity, regarding teleological structures of value as a strictly hu man phenomenon.
7. The main barriers to the acceptance of a teleological account of non-human nature are, it seems to me, difficulties encountered in generalizing teleology beyond certain mentalistic paradigms involving conscious goals or expected outcomes singled out by human interest and imaginatively pre-envisaged. Even self-professed Aristotelians like Aquinas and Hegel, while acknowledging a teleological nature, have made it de pendent upon a mind that is either immanent in nature's work ings or else nature's transcendent author.
8. Against Aquinas and Hegel and most modems, for whom teleology is inconceivable apart from consciously pre envisaged goals, stands Aristotle. We should, I think, stand with him for several reasons.
(a)The partial parallelism between conscious and uncon scious processes is evident when, e.g., health, a conscious de sideratum, is also the natural product of bodily processes that fight disease with antibodies and restore rent flesh.
(b)The line between consciously directed and uncon scious behavior is difficult to trace. The adolescent gravitates by his classmate's house on the way to school before he admits consciously to himself that he is fond of her and would like to see her. And actions once consciously attended to, like walk-
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ing, we subsequently perform habitually without explicit con ception of what we are trying to do. If, then, in our own per sons we find such correlations between the directions of con scious and unconscious behavior, is it not reasonable to extend the concept of directed behaviour throughout the organic realm where we find structural and behavioural similarities with our selves?
9. But (c), even if we should side with the biological re ductionists who find no irreducible directedness in organisms, we have not abandoned teleology altogether. Gravitational at tractions and electromagnetic phenomena illustrate nonconscious directional orientations for behavior, as physical en tities become targets for one another. A reductionist is an ide ologist who has room for electromagnetic vectors but not sex ual or hunger vectors as characteristic of the entities in his scheme.
10. Finally, (d) mentalistic views of teleology are con fused even in their interpretations of the human paradigms. Teleology is thought to be more easily conceived in the men talistic examples because the goal is supposed to be function ing in the present in the form of a pre-conception, so that with out the pre-conception there could be not effective goal. But this is to confuse concept with object. A concept of an elephant is not an elephant but a way of orienting ourselves towards ele phants, which do or might exist in the world beyond. Similarly, unless our only aim is to daydream, the concept or preenvisagement of a goal is not itself our goal but a way of ori enting ourselves towards something desired which is an actual ity or possibility lying beyond our present selves. Conceptions of objects and goals rest upon a non-conceptual existence and directedness. It is this reference beyond the conceptual sphere which mentalistic ideologists overlook. They are idealists of value even when not idealists of fact.
11. Aristotle, Plato, and other ideologists have suffered
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