Приложение 1
Дескриптивная статистика
|
Наблюдений |
Среднее |
Ст. откл. |
Минимум |
Максимум |
||
|
Показатели структуры собственности |
||||||
|
Традиционные инвестиционные фонды |
15,298 |
62.1 |
35.3 |
0.0 |
100.0 |
|
|
Банковские институты |
15,021 |
2.1 |
6.4 |
0.0 |
100.0 |
|
|
Государственные пенсионные фонд |
14,939 |
2.0 |
3.6 |
0.0 |
100.0 |
|
|
Хедж-фонды |
15,119 |
5.8 |
5.1 |
0.0 |
53.3 |
|
|
Частные инвестиционные фонды |
13,448 |
0.8 |
2.2 |
0.0 |
63.1 |
|
|
Корпоративные пенсионные фонды |
8,312 |
0.3 |
0.7 |
0.0 |
23.3 |
|
|
PE/VC фонды (<5%) |
10,060 |
0.7 |
1.7 |
0.0 |
28.0 |
|
|
Страховые компании |
4,889 |
0.2 |
0.7 |
0.0 |
17.9 |
|
|
Эндаунмент фонды |
9,311 |
0.2 |
1.2 |
0.0 |
33.9 |
|
|
Суверенные инвестиционные фонды |
3,711 |
0.1 |
0.2 |
0.0 |
4.8 |
|
|
REIT / Недвижимость |
384 |
0.8 |
2.6 |
0.0 |
23.3 |
|
|
Всего институциональное владение |
15,337 |
73.6 |
44.0 |
0.0 |
100.0 |
|
|
Всего долгосрочное владение |
15,320 |
65.3 |
41.1 |
0.0 |
100.0 |
|
|
Показатели КУ |
||||||
|
ТОП 5 собственников |
15,369 |
40.1 |
17.6 |
0.0 |
100.0 |
|
|
ТОП 20 собственников |
15,369 |
67.3 |
21.5 |
0.0 |
100.0 |
|
|
ТОП 50 собственников |
15,370 |
81.2 |
35.6 |
0.0 |
100.0 |
|
|
Доля блокирующих акционеров |
15,109 |
36.1 |
22.9 |
5.0 |
100.0 |
|
|
Доля активных инвесторов |
15,315 |
57.5 |
44.4 |
0.0 |
100.0 |
|
|
Процент независимых директоров |
12,299 |
78.2 |
14.0 |
11.1 |
100.0 |
|
|
Независимый глава комитета по назначениям |
10,745 |
99.5 |
5.6 |
0.0 |
100.0 |
|
|
Количество независимых директоров в комитете по назначениям |
10,192 |
3.8 |
1.3 |
1.0 |
14.0 |
|
|
Доля, принадлежащая инсайдерам |
9,297 |
6.4 |
10.6 |
0.0 |
100.0 |
|
|
CEO duality, % |
6,453 |
1.0 |
0.0 |
1.0 |
1.0 |
|
|
Доля женщин в совете директоров |
9,519 |
17.4 |
8.1 |
0.0 |
100.0 |
|
|
Возраст CEO |
21,240 |
56.2 |
7.5 |
30.0 |
85.0 |
|
|
Источник: расчеты автора |
Приложение 2А
Результаты регрессий на независимость совета директоров в зависимости от доли, принадлежащей ТОП 5 инвесторам. В скобках указаны стандартные отклонения. ***, **,* обозначает статистическую значимость на 1%, 5%, 10% уровне соответственно
|
<20% |
20%-50% |
50%-70% |
Более 70% |
||
|
% независимых директоров |
% независимых директоров |
% независимых директоров |
% независимых директоров |
||
|
Доля долгосрочн. инв.(t-1) |
0.123 |
0.0654* |
0.0127* |
0.339** |
|
|
(0.01820) |
(0.1019) |
(0.0925) |
(0.188) |
||
|
ROA |
-0.0425 |
-0.0650*** |
-0.0721 |
-0.0839 |
|
|
(0.0657) |
(0.0187) |
(0.0498) |
(0.1000) |
||
|
Финансовый рычаг |
-0.0273 |
0.00361 |
-0.00658 |
-0.113*** |
|
|
(0.0370) |
(0.0075) |
(0.0215) |
(0.0370) |
||
|
Размер |
2.120*** |
1.576*** |
-0.385 |
-3.392*** |
|
|
(0.3810) |
(0.1030) |
(0.3280) |
(0.5240) |
||
|
Возраст |
0.0102 |
0.0479*** |
0.0430* |
0.0636 |
|
|
(0.0188) |
(0.0057) |
(0.0259) |
(0.0418) |
||
|
Market to book |
-0.0504 |
0.214* |
0.169 |
-0.377 |
|
|
(0.6110) |
(0.1200) |
(0.2740) |
(0.7770) |
||
|
# наблюдений |
265 |
6,343 |
740 |
290 |
|
|
R-квадрат |
0.187 |
0.078 |
0.035 |
0.233 |
Приложение 2Б
Результаты регрессий на долю женщин в совете директоров в зависимости от доли, принадлежащей ТОП 5 инвесторам. В скобках указаны стандартные отклонения. ***, **,* обозначает статистическую значимость на 1%, 5%, 10% уровне соответственно
|
<20% |
20%-50% |
50%-70% |
Более 70% |
||
|
Доля женщин в совете дир. |
Доля женщин в совете дир. |
Доля женщин в совете дир. |
Доля женщин в совете дир. |
||
|
Доля долгосрочн. инв. (t-1) |
-0.630*** |
-0.0102 |
-0.00254 |
0.0736** |
|
|
(0.1570) |
(0.0145) |
(0.0277) |
(0.0848) |
||
|
ROA |
0.166* |
-0.0124 |
-0.019 |
0.0921 |
|
|
(0.0885) |
(0.0127) |
(0.0358) |
(0.0936) |
||
|
Финансовый рычаг |
0.0118 |
0.0173*** |
0.00405 |
-0.0304 |
|
|
(0.0340) |
(0.0050) |
(0.0106) |
(0.0274) |
||
|
Институц. Владение (t-1) |
0.420*** |
-0.0127 |
0.0179 |
0.3388*** |
|
|
(0.1310) |
(0.0124) |
(0.0234) |
(0.0381) |
||
|
Размер |
1.051*** |
0.557*** |
0.0688 |
1.374*** |
|
|
(0.3080) |
(0.0655) |
(0.1930) |
(0.3810) |
||
|
Возраст |
0.0095 |
0.0233*** |
0.0299* |
0.122*** |
|
|
(0.0140) |
(0.0035) |
(0.0166) |
(0.0311) |
||
|
Market to book |
1.242 |
0.165** |
0.19 |
0.197 |
|
|
(0.8850) |
(0.0835) |
(0.2030) |
(0.6920) |
||
|
Константа |
9.853*** |
12.82*** |
14.15*** |
25.07*** |
|
|
(3.2740) |
(0.7170) |
(1.7010) |
(3.6870) |
||
|
# наблюдений |
258 |
5,443 |
510 |
162 |
|
|
R-квадрат |
0.141 |
0.036 |
0.015 |
0.207 |
|
|
Источник: расчеты автора |
Приложение 3
Корреляционная матрица
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