Материал: Payaslian S., The History of Armenia From the Origins to the Present

Russia, was mired in civil war between the White and Red armies. The coiled webs of diplomatic, economic, and geostrategic considerations compounded the burden of isolation. Armenia sought to maintain relations with the competing forces in Russia, but the Armed Forces of South Russia under the command of Lieutenant General Anton Denikin seemed the best alternative because of its proximity and support for Armenians in territories under its control. Closer association with it, however, would elicit the traditional Russophobic reactions from London and Paris as well as the other western capitals at a time when the success of the Armenian delegation at the peace conference depended in large part on its ability to convince western representatives of Armenia’s reliability as a “democratic” republic. A turn to the White or Red Russians would perhaps benefit Armenia in the short run, but both sought the revival of the Russian empire. While it was clear that neither London nor Paris would tolerate Bolshevik supremacy, policymakers in both capitals were divided with respect to the White Army. The situation seemed hopeless for the Erevan government. Despite repeated Allied assurances that issues of moral weight would receive favorable attention at Paris, the conference offered no such solutions.37

The Armenian government faced a serious dilemma in relations with Turkey, where two competing forces—one in Constantinople under the sultan and another in Ankara under Mustafa Kemal—made bilateral relations difficult. In this case, however, the Armenian people, after enduring massacres and destruction, would have found it virtually impossible to contemplate reconciliation and normalization of relations with a divided or united Turkey.38 The sultanate in Constantinople merely expressed its sorrow at the recent “incidents” under the government of the Ittihadists (Committee of Union and Progress) and promised that such violations would never occur again. The Nationalists in Ankara blamed the Armenians directly for the bloodshed and refused even to recognize the Armenian presence in their historic homeland. In March 1919 Major General Kiazim Karabekir thus promised to reassert Turkish control over the sanjaks (counties) of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, and marched toward Armenia. Kemal and Karabekir were prepared to unite against Constantinople and all foreign (including Armenian) intervention in the Ottoman Empire. They particularly deplored officials in the capital who so readily acquiesced in Allied orders that threatened Turkish lands and interests, especially with respect to the extension of Armenian borders to the six provinces. When the Erzerum Congress led by Kemal met on July 23, 1919, at the famed Sanasarian Academy to declare national unity and the defense of the Turkish homeland against outside threats, Kemal had broken official ties with Constantinople. In its stead, he found a powerful, albeit temporary, ally in Russia, where the Bolshevik leaders welcomed Nationalist cooperation to eliminate Allied influence in Turkey and to control events in the Caucasus.39

After a year of independence, the Erevan government had begun to adjust to the difficulties in foreign policy and the daily struggle to organize the nation’s economy. Intensive diplomatic efforts were necessary to attain a

modicum of representation at the peace conference, while territorial disputes with the neighboring nations remained as explosive as ever. On the home front, economic and infrastructural development at home registered some successes, but the historically “natural” division of the nation between TurkishArmenians and Russian Armenians intensified tensions between the political parties. In an attempt to bridge that gap between the two, the cabinet of the acting premier Aleksandr Khatisian adopted two policies, both of symbolic nature but fraught with enormous legal and military implications. On May 26, in preparation for the first anniversary of the republic’s independence, the cabinet adopted the Act of United Armenia which proclaimed the “official unification of Western Armenia and the Republic of Armenia. This act was followed (on May 27) by the formation of a twelve-member Western-Armenian bloc in the Khorhurd. Clearly, the Act expressed Armenian aspirations for the creation of a single Armenia. Could the Western-Armenian bloc in the parliament translate such desires into policy? On the day of the anniversary, Armenians greeted both acts with jubilation and a sense of national triumph.40

THE KHATISIAN GOVERNMENT

The first national parliamentary elections were held on June 21 to 23, 1919. The Social Democrats who early on realized they could not muster sufficient votes and the Armenian Democratic party boycotted them. The Democrats, who at the time of the proclamation of the Act had supported the initiative, shifted their position on account of intra-party disagreements. They also noted, however, that the legal authority to issue a declaration of such import resided in the parliament, not in the cabinet. Of the 260,000 votes, Dashnaktsutiun received 230,772 votes (88.95 percent, 72 of the 80 seats), while the Social Revolutionary party received 13,289 votes (5.12 percent, 4 seats). The Khorhurd named Aleksandr Khatisian as head of the provisional cabinet until the legislators reconvened on August 1. On August 5 the Khorhrdaran (parliament) confirmed the election of Khatisian as minister-president, and on August 10, the new cabinet.41 On that date Khatisian presented his government’s program to the Khorhrdaran (parliament). He stressed that the pro-western posture adopted since independence continued to constitute a key component in Armenian foreign policy. At home, his government would intensify the institutionalization of “Armenianization” programs (e.g., through eliminating Russian bureaucratic traditions), establish new national and local state organizations to address various social and economic issues, lower indirect taxes, and promote foreign direct investments. It was not surprising that the Social Revolutionary party, which held seats in the parliament, and Social Democrat party, which did not, criticized these programs and raised a host of questions not

addressed by the premier. Would the government, for example, support Armenian integration into a federative structure with Russia? To what extent would the government allow foreign capital to penetrate the republic’s economy, thereby rendering it dependent “on imperialist powers” and vulnerable to “colonial exploitation”? Khatisian also faced an increasingly divided the Dashnakist party. The Western Armenian members resented the Russian cultural influence in the governmental administrative agencies, while the Eastern Armenians—heavily influenced by that same culture— advocated pro-Russian policies. The more radical wing of the party (most prominently Ruben Ter Minasian) was convinced that “parliamentarism” and democratic ideals could prove detrimental to the sovereignty and survival of the republic at this critical point.42

The ideological-political controversies and tensions aside, by the second half of 1919, the government bureaucracies had achieved some degree of structural and functional constancy, although their political legitimacy waxed and waned depending on the domestic and international circumstances. The Ministry of Internal Affairs proved most controversial, as it shouldered the responsibilities of both internal security and law and order. The political parties, including the Dashnaktsutiun, frequently criticized the ministry for its failure to combat bureaucratic corruption and instability to provide sufficient security for the villagers beyond Erevan and for the transportation of goods. Structural reforms and greater decentralization were necessary to institute accountability and democratization, the critics argued. The Khatisian government and the Khorhrdaran took several steps in an effort to remedy the situation. In May 1919 the cabinet had authorized the ministry to organize Zemstvos (local assemblies), and in January 1920 the nation held its first local elections. The public elected the district (gavarak) assemblies, and the latter subsequently elected the county (gavar) assemblies. The Ministry of Judicial Affairs, created by the Khorhurd in December 1918, replaced the oppressive tsarist court system. At the apex of the judicial hierarchy rested the supreme court, the Tserakuit (Senate). Below it was the Datastanakan Palat (Palace of Justice) with appellate functions, followed by the shrjanayin dataran (circuit courts) and small claims courts. One of the ministry’s major tasks was to transform the deeply ingrained public distrust of the tsarist courts into public confidence in the Armenian courts. It sought to improve the legal procedures governing criminal investigations and required the use of the Armenian language in all criminal proceedings.43 On March 15, 1920, Armenians witnessed the nation’s first trial by jury. As historian Richard Hovannisian describes most aptly: “The newspapers hailed the trial as a judicial milestone, and in the courtroom Chilingarian and Khatisian spoke of its significance in the evolution of a democratic republic. The actual legal proceedings were awkward and even amusing, as the prosecutor,

public defender, and judges of the tribunal groped for the appropriate Armenian terms, but there was above all a sense of exhilaration, for after centuries of submission to the courts and discriminatory regulations of alien powers, the Armenians had succeeded in introducing the jury system in their national language.”44

The responsibilities of the ministries of provisions and of finance were equally daunting but far more dispiriting. During its short life, the Ministry of Provisions administered the government-owned depots and the distribution of food and fuel as well as goods procured through foreign aid programs to meet, with the Ministry of Welfare, the needs of more than 580,000 refugees. Charges of rampant corruption in late 1919, however, led to its termination in January 1920. The Ministry of Finance struggled to maintain monetary stability and to check inflationary pressures. While the economy registered some minor improvements (e.g., in exports), the nation’s financial health remained directly tied to the issue of international recognition of the republic as a sovereign entity. In the absence of such recognition, financial centers in Europe and the United States were reluctant to expend their resources. The Ministry of Education assumed responsibilities for maintaining all educational institutions, including some previously within the jurisdiction of the catholicosate at Echmiadzin. Under the existing economic conditions, the Armenian Church could not finance its school operations, which, along with other schools in the republic, became state institutions.45

The Armenian government lacked the ability to address a range of foreign policy issues, all which demanded resources beyond its capabilities. The rapidly changing international situation only made matters worse. The British withdrawal from the Caucasus and the matter of Allied recognition of the republic as a sovereign state underscored the potency of this reality. As the date for the British withdrawal neared, debate regarding mandatory responsibilities intensified, particularly on issues surrounding the repatriation of Western Armenians to their native land. The European powers determined that the United States, which claimed no territorial ambitions in the Caucasus, was best suited for such a role. The Armenian government expected the United States to extend recognition to the republic and to serve as the mandatory power securing the protection of Armenia. The Supreme Council had decided in June 1919 to postpone a final decision on the mandate question until the Wilson administration could state whether it would accept a mandate in parts of the former Ottoman empire. The Wilson administration, however, would respond only after Senate ratification of the German peace treaty and U.S. membership in the League of Nations. In the meantime, debates raged on in different quarters as to whether the United States could accept the mandate over Armenia and the extent to which U.S. foreign policy could promote humanitarian causes in conjunction with commercial considerations.46

To investigate matters, the Wilson administration sent two missions to the Ottoman lands. In March 1919 the administration secured the approval of the European powers to dispatch an Allied commission of inquiry (the King-Crane Commission) to survey issues involving the separation of nations from the Ottoman empire. After the commission traveled throughout the region during August, its members supported the joint-mandate approach. The King-Crane report stated that the Armenians could not be entrusted to Turkish rule and that a separate Armenia was necessary to secure their survival and to prevent further massacres by the Turks. The commission noted that the boundaries of the Armenian state should extend to parts of Trebizond, Erzerum, Bitlis, and Van (those areas under Russian control in 1916–1917), but Armenian territorial aspirations aside, Sivas, Kharpert, and Cilicia should be part of Anatolia. In case of failure in management, future negotiations would determine the status of these territories under Armenian rule. The report, submitted to the Wilson administration on September 27, 1919, was simply shelved.47

Wilson also appointed General James C. Harbord to head a mission to the Ottoman empire and the Caucasus in order to examine the feasibility of accepting mandatory responsibilities. The Harbord mission (September–October 1919) presented its report to the administration on November 12, 1919. It proposed to implement the unitary model advocated by Caleb Gates, president of Robert College, and Admiral Bristol, whereby a single mandatory would supervise the entire area from Constantinople to the Caucasus. Such a mandate would require an army of 59,000 soldiers and a five-year budget of over $756 million. The report included a list of fourteen reasons for and thirteen reasons against a U.S. mandate. The reasons favoring a mandate stressed the humanitarian bases for such a policy but offered little tangible benefits for the United States. Point 7 noted that “the building of railroads would offer opportunities to our capital,” and Point 13 cautioned that “better millions for a mandate than billions for future wars.” The reasons against a mandate, however, acknowledged the domestic and international complexities arising from deepening U.S. involvement in the region. Despite the overall favorable tone of the full report vis-à-vis Armenia and Armenians, it raised serious questions regarding the political, economic, and geostrategic feasibility of a U.S. mandate. The Harbord report also was shelved and was not submitted to the Senate until April 1920.48

The mandate issue remained inextricably intertwined with the Treaty of Versailles, U.S. participation in the League of Nations, and U.S. deployment of military forces in Armenia. In congressional debates, the proponents for a U.S. mandate underscored humanitarian and moral responsibilities for justice and peace. Mobilization of political support at home for an expansive U.S. role, however, required far greater and