Материал: Payaslian S., The History of Armenia From the Origins to the Present

southeastward to Bash Abaran. The Armenian defenses under General Nazarbekian resisted the Turkish advance between Karakilisa and Dilijan. General Dro (Drastamat Kanayan) defended the route from Hamamlu to Bash Abaran to Erevan, while General Movses Silikian defended the road to Sardarabad. As Turkish forces were driven back on all three fronts, Armenians insisted on marching to Alexandropol and on to Kars. Yet the National Council, calculating that the limited supplies of ammunition could not sustain a prolonged conflict, ordered the Armenian forces to halt the advance. The Batum delegation had secured a peace agreement.19

On June 4, 1918, the Armenian delegation at Batum signed the “Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the Imperial Ottoman Government and the Republic of Armenia” and its supplementary agreements, setting the new boundaries between the two nations and the conditions for the conduct of their bilateral relations.20 Additional agreements notwithstanding Armenians and Turks clashed in the region of Pambak; by the middle of July Turkish troops rapidly approached Erevan and stationed cannons four miles from the city and Echmiadzin.21

The National Council formed the new government with the intention of creating a coalition cabinet headed by Kachaznuni. Unable to bring together a coalition government, however, the council permitted the new premier to form his cabinet independently of party affiliation. In early July, after much bickering, the Armenian leaders finally agreed to relocate the government seat from Tiflis to Erevan, and on July 19, under most inauspicious circumstances amidst death and destruction, the new Armenian government entered Erevan to resume leadership of the nation after centuries of state dormancy.22

On August 1, 1918, the Armenian Khorhurd (legislative body) held its first session, and on August 3 Kachaznuni presented the general outlines of his government’s program. The Armenian state, he noted, lacked the fundamental ingredients of political economy, and it had to build anew institutions of public administration, of law and order, of health and welfare. The new government had to address the issues of refugees and their survival amid homelessness, hunger, and unsanitary conditions. Disarmament of the population was particularly vexing. Some, including Minister of Internal Affairs Aram Manukian, argued in favor of total disarmament of the populace as a necessary step toward establishing law and order. Others, however, contended that a people who had experienced turmoil and treachery for years would not comply with orders to surrender their arms, and insisted instead on allowing the armed population to contribute to the defense of the nation.23

In Constantinople, the government of Ahmed Izzet Pasha, having replaced the Young Turk regime, signed the Mudros Armistice on October 30, 1918, prior to the German surrender on November 11. With respect to

Armenia, the armistice provided for the evacuation of the Ottoman troops from the Caucasus and northern Persia (Iran), the demobilization of the Ottoman troops except in areas that required maintenance of law and order, and the release of imprisoned Armenians. The Allies would occupy Baku and Batum. At the Mudros conference, while the Allies insisted on Turkish evacuation of Transcaucasia, they were mainly concerned with maintaining access to the Dardanelles and the Black Sea.24 The Turkish delegation was temporarily successful in keeping the province of Kars and sections of the Batum province as well as in delinking Cilicia from the historic Armenian provinces. In November, as provided by the Mudros Armistice, Turkey completed its withdrawal from the Erevan guberniia (province), British troops occupied Baku, and General George F. Milne’s Army of the Black Sea established its headquarters at Constantinople. The Allied authorities now stationed in the Ottoman capital were to command the occupying forces in Anatolia and the Caucasus.25

WITH THE WESTERN POWERS IN PARIS

On December 8, 1918, the Armenian delegation, headed by Avetis Aharonian, left Erevan for the long-awaited Paris Peace Conference. The delegation arrived at Paris on February 4, 1919, only to learn that the Allied Powers had excluded the Republic of Armenia from the official list of participant states. Further complicating matters was the presence of Boghos Nubar Pasha as president of the Armenian National Delegation. As the official representative of the republic, Aharonian represented what may be termed the minimalist position with respect to his government’s objectives at Paris. He had instructions to win Allied support for Armenian control over Eastern and Western Armenian provinces, with a corridor to ports on the Black Sea. Extension of Armenian borders to Trebizond and Cilicia seemed unrealistic for so weak a government heading so devastated a country. Boghos Nubar represented the maximalist position. The existing small republic, he and his supporters contended, was not established in the historic lands of Armenia. Instead, they argued, the boundaries of the republic should be extended not only to the six provinces but also to Cilicia.26 The true Armenia would embrace the Armenian heartland and would have access to the Mediterranean, thus eliminating the potential threats of coercion and blockage strangulating its economy. Despite their differences, for the sake of unified representation both men agreed to function as the “Delegation of Integral Armenia.”27

The Armenian delegation in Paris was encouraged by the favorable official and public sentiments expressed in western capitals. As early as January 1918, President Woodrow Wilson in his Fourteen Points had outlined

his support regarding the Ottoman subjects. The American Commission to Negotiate Peace (formerly the Inquiry) proposed an Armenian state whose boundaries would include not only historic Armenia and the republic, but also Cilicia, Trebizond, Akhaltsik (Akhaltskha), and Akhalkalak. The Western Asian Division even recommended inclusion of Karabagh and Alexandretta. The British proposal concurred, as indicated in an official memorandum dated February 7, 1919. When Aharonian and Nubar Pasha met with the Council of Ten (Supreme Allied Council) on February 26, they presented the Armenian case along similar lines. Disagreements among France, Italy, and Britain soon weakened the Armenian position, as the European powers struggled to protect their interests after the expected partition of the Ottoman lands and in the Middle East. With the exception of protecting the Baku-Batum pipeline, the British showed no interest in greater involvement in the Caucasus; in March 1919 they prepared to withdraw from the region and announced July 15 as the withdrawal date, later postponed until August 15.28

That political and economic support from the western powers would not be forthcoming any time soon should have been obvious to the Armenian delegation by the simple fact that they refused to extend formal recognition to the republic. Even the most ardent advocate of selfdetermination, President Wilson, withheld recognition on grounds that the prevailing circumstances did not permit such a step at that time. Recognition of that republic, the western powers feared, would invite unacceptable political, economic, and military obligations. The Turkish government found support among the Allied military officials (most notably Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, senior American naval officer) stationed in Constantinople, who opposed Armenian claims to statehood and rejected proposals to extend Armenian boundaries to the Mediterranean or the Black Sea. The protection of Armenia, they argued, would require enormous military capability for the complete occupation of the Ottoman Empire. None of the major powers showed any willingness to shoulder such responsibilities. Britain, the only power that possessed the necessary military force in the region, was already preparing for withdrawal from the Caucasus.29 Could the Republic of Armenia survive without the protection of a major power?

BETWEEN GEORGIA AND AZERBAIJAN

In late 1918 the Georgian military had restrengthened its position in northern Lori, but the local Armenian population requested unification with Armenia. Disagreements over such territorial issues escalated hostilities into open warfare. Beginning on December 14, Armenian troops advanced toward

Vorontsovka and the regions of Haghpat and Akhova. After the initial successful advance, Dro’s forces launched a major offensive toward Tiflis. The warring parties finally agreed to a truce mediated by the Allied Powers. On December 31, when the hostilities ceased, the Armenian forces were in control of the region south of the Khram River. Between January 9 and 17, 1919, the negotiations for a peaceful settlement led to the creation of the neutral zone at Borchalu under British supervision, while Georgia retained soldiers in Akhalkalak.30 Armenia and Georgia also sought to contain recurring clashes with the neighboring Muslims. Both governments attempted to develop functional bases for bilateral cooperation, and in March 1919 they agreed to create a joint commission on transportation, while the finance ministries worked toward a common monetary union. These projects were curtailed, however, when tensions resurfaced both at home and in international forums, such as the conferences of the Second International at Berne (February-May 1919), where both delegations could not conceal their differences under the cloak of conciliatory pronouncements.31

Nor were relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan more peaceful. As the Muslims gained control over Baku and Ganja (Gandzak; Elisavetpol, the temporary capital), they aimed at extending their rule over Karabagh and Zangezur where close relations with the Ottoman army strengthened their position vis-à-vis Armenians in both regions. Despite Turkish-Azeri demands for submission, by September the Armenians were prepared to resist by force.32 Yet they were no match for the combined Muslim forces who marched to Shushi in early October. Only in the mountains of Zangezur (encompassing the districts of Sisian, Goris, Ghapan, and Meghri), the troops under General Antranik Ozanian offered a stiff resistance, but here too soon shortages in supplies and ammunition required help from the Erevan government. The Kachaznuni government pursued two seemingly contradictory policies regarding the region: In diplomatic discussions with Turkish officials, it tried to distance itself from the conflicts in Karabagh and Zangezur. Yet it also claimed jurisdiction over the area and contended that territorial detachment from Armenia would violate Armenian national sovereignty and unity. As in the case of ArmenoGeorgian hostilities, British mediation temporarily restored order.33

Armenians expected British intercession to tilt the balance of power in their favor, but soon they would be disillusioned. As noted, the British were concerned primarily with gaining access to oil supplies via the BakuBatum pipeline, and they considered the Muslim leadership with Turkish support far more reliable as a political and military force in the region. While emphasizing that the Paris Peace Conference would finally resolve the existing territorial disputes in the Caucasus, on December 28, 1918, General William Thomson sanctioned the establishment of a government in Azerbaijan, headed by Khan Khoiskii as the legal authority in

Azerbaijan, thereby informally extending British recognition to the Republic of Azerbaijan. The situation for Armenians took a particularly alarming turn when on January 15, 1919, Thomson also approved the appointment of Khosrov Bek Sultanov as provisional governor-general of Mountainous Karabagh and Zangezur. The Armenians in the region were all too familiar with Sultanov’s virulently anti-Armenian policies in cooperation with the Ottoman forces and his pan-Turkic aspirations. General Thomson rejected Armenian appeals to prevent Sultanov’s governorship in Karabagh, and insisted on the immediate restoration of law and order.34

Order and stability, however, would not ameliorate the deteriorating economic conditions for Armenians within and without the republic. While the gradual clarification and formation of party coalitions began to establish some semblance of institutional normalcy in the Khorhurd, masses of refugees and the population in general needed housing, food, medical attention, and other necessities of life the destroyed economy could ill afford. The enormity of the difficulties notwithstanding, the Kachaznuni government began the process of reconstructing the country’s economic infrastructure.35 The government, with meager public and private funds, encouraged factory operations, built hospitals, surveyed the land for resources, rebuilt the communication system, and launched “Armenianization” campaigns in bureaucracies and educational institutions. These achievements, however, could not conceal the tensions within the government.

One of the most serious issues in early 1919 was the role of the Dashnaktsutiun as the leading political party and its relations with the government. The more conservative members (e.g., Kachaznuni) argued that having founded the republic, now the party Bureau, the organization’s highest decision-making body, must relinquish direct control over government operations. The cabinet, they argued, should first and foremost be directly responsible to the Khorhurd rather than to the bureau, while the latter worked closely with party members in the parliament. The more radical factions within the party rejected these arguments. They complained that, once in power, the Dashnakist government had virtually ignored the revolutionary tenets of the party and had adopted an accommodative posture toward the bourgeoisie who not long ago had condemned and cast derision on the revolutionary activities of the Dashnaktsutiun. The Khorhurd was even more polarized between the Dashnakist-Armenian Democratic majority and the Social Revolution-Social Democrat opposition. The former stressed that the priorities of national security and physical survival demanded immediate decisions with respect to the Muslim population rather than become mired in parliamentary procedures and debates. The opposition, however, emphasized the need to cultivate interethnic confidence through caution and compromise as Armenia had remained virtually isolated from the outside world.36

The coiled webs of diplomatic, economic, and geostrategic considerations compounded the burden of isolation. The only possible ally in the region,