Материал: Payaslian S., The History of Armenia From the Origins to the Present

realized that they themselves were in fact divided along lines of nationality, each led by its own political organizations and motivated by its own territorial claims. Declarations of Transcaucasian brotherhood and unity thus proved transitory, as the collapse of the tsarist regime exposed the contradictory interests of the Armenian, Georgian, and Muslim peoples. For most Armenians, the fundamental issues pertaining to the physical survival of Turkish Armenia and the military resources needed to strengthen Russian Armenia had relegated intra-Caucasus relations to a secondary concern at best. The Armenian political parties, among them the Dashnaktsutiun, Hay Zhoghovrdakan Kusaktsutyun (Armenian Democratic Party), the Armenian Social Democrats, and the Social Revolutionaries, proposed different platforms for the envisioned postRomanov Armenia, but for now their disagreements over details could be overlooked. All concurred that, in the absence of concrete support from the Allied Powers, Armenia would rely on Russian military protection if the latter were so inclined.

Georgian and Muslim views were not as clear, however. Some of the leading Georgian Mensheviks, such as Noi (Noah) Zhordania, for example, initially opposed nationalist aspirations as “a weapon of the bourgeoisie” and advocated incorporation of the Caucasus into a single Russian republic. Other Georgians insisted on some form of national autonomy and the creation of a more democratic government than conceivable under Russian domination. The leading Muslim Musavat (Equality) Party championed wider aspirations, as encapsulated in the slogan “Turkism, Islamism, and Modernism.” The party advocated a return to the “golden age” of Islam and the revival of Islamic unity transcending all territorial and sectoral borders. Some of the leading members of the Musavat also accepted integration into a Transcaucasian federative republic, proposed at the Transcaucasian Conference of Muslims held at Baku in April 1917, so long as it would respect local or national autonomy and the security of Muslims. Russo-Turkish relations ultimately determined the general outcome of the regional conflicts. Another Transcaucasian conference later in the year established the Transcaucasian Federation with its Commissariat as the executive body and the Seim as the legislative body.5

The creation of an integrative Transcaucasian federation was premised on the assumption that a consensus of coalitions existed among the various political groups with mutually compatible interests and objectives and that local conditions were conducive to equality in administration and economy. Yet the interests were essentially and inextricably national in orientation and collided against each other and with Russian national priorities. The latter, as for centuries under the tsarist regime, continued to view the Caucasus as a mere territorial buffer with the Ottoman Empire, its principal rival in the region, and unreservedly subordinated its

Caucasian relations to the wider pressing needs of war and peace. Neither the Petrograd Provisional Government nor the Bolshevik opposition could for long conceal the widening gap between the rhetoric and reality of Russian policy toward the region. Matters were made infinitely worse for the Russian empire and its Armenian subjects when the Bolshevik opposition seized power in November 1917.

The Bolshevik Revolution ushered in a new cadre of leaders, headed by Vladimir I. Lenin, who had criticized Lvov and Kerenski for their involvement in the “imperialistic war.” Upon assuming power, the new cabinet, the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom), chaired by Lenin, issued the “Declaration of Peoples’ Rights,” which, in addition to guarantees for political and economic equality and development, also promised national self-determination and the right to secede. Proclamations of democratic principles notwithstanding, the Sovnarkom in fact opposed self-determination in the Russian periphery and would not countenance centrifugal proclivities by the nationalities.6 The Bolshevik obfuscation of intent could have served the Armenians well, for the latter sought national autonomy for Eastern and Western Armenia but within a Russian federative structure that could provide a security shield against the Ottoman army and Turkism. The Bolsheviks and Dashnaktsutiun—both products of revolutionary movements—could even cooperate in security and political matters. But in practice the Bolshevik scheme for “self-determination” deepened Armenian distrust toward the party, for that policy would mean the withdrawal of Russian forces from the occupied territories in Western Armenia, which in turn could result in the occupation by the Turkish forces and their advance into the Caucasus. Indeed, even such ardent Bolsheviks as Stepan Shahumyan understood the deleterious implications of “self-determination” for Armenians at this perilous juncture.7

With the exception of a small number of Bolshevik sympathizers, people in the Caucasus—Armenians, Georgians, and Muslims alike—vehemently opposed the Bolshevik seizure of power and their policies toward the region. A Transcaucasian conference, meeting on November 24, 1917, to address issues concerning the altered relation with Russia, created an interim administrative body, the Transcaucasian Commissariat, until the conclusion of the elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. That assembly met on January 18, 1918, only to be routed by the Bolsheviks.8

While the delegates were preparing for the Constituent Assembly, General M.A. Przhevalskii, Russian Commander of the Caucasus Front, received a proposal for truce from General Mehmed Vehib Pasha. General Vyshinskii of the Caucasus Army traveled to Erzinjan, where on December 18, 1917, he signed the truce, which provided for the immediate cessation of hostilities, establishment of a neutral zone between the Turkish and Russian armies, exchange of information with respect to military training on both sides of the demilitarized

zone, termination of transfer of Turkish soldiers to the Mesopotamian front, enforcement of Kurdish compliance with the truce, and advance communication of “modification or abrogation of the truce.”9 The demoralized Russian army was prepared to leave the war.

WAR AND REPUBLIC

The military situation in Western Armenia deteriorated as the Russian army began to withdraw. The Western Armenian Bureau, the executive committee of the Western Armenian Council comprised of representatives of Armenian political parties, convened a meeting in December and established a defense council to organize Armenian military units to replace the Russian forces in protecting Western Armenia. The Armenian soldiers, totaling no more than 20,000, were now responsible for defending the 250mile stretch from Erzinjan to Van.10 By January 1918 the Erzinjan Truce was in the process of dissolution as Kurdish attacks on the Armenian soldiers continued unchecked. On February 1 Vehib Pasha, claiming that Armenian “bands” were killing Muslims in the Russian zone, issued an ultimatum and moved Turkish forces across the neutral zone. Bolshevik declarations of “peace at any price” seemed to have encouraged the Turkish command to advance, and Colonel Kiazim Karabekir, undoubtedly apprised of the Russo-German peace overtures, soon captured Erzinjan, thus securing his prestige under the banner of Pan-Turkism across the Ottoman Empire and among the Caucasian Muslims.11 Under the Russo-German Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed on March 3, 1918, and ratified on March 15, the Bolsheviks agreed to accept “peace at any price,” to withdraw from the provinces of Eastern Anatolia and return them to Turkey (Article IV), and “to demobilize and dissolve the Armenian bands” in Russia and in the occupied Turkish provinces (Article I[5]).12

Meanwhile, Karabekir’s army, having completed its offensive on Erzinjan, advanced farther eastward and captured Erzerum on March 12. Within a day the Turkish army was in control of the city and continued its march to Merdenek and Ardahan. The Armenian military defeat was repeated at several fronts, such as Van, Khnus, and Alashkert in early April 1918. Turkish troops advanced to Kars and Batum and captured the latter city within hours on April 14. General Tovmas Nazarbekian continued to defend Kars, and an emergency conference held at Alexandropol agreed to continue its defense for as long as possible. The defense of Kars did not last long, however.13

What transpired next reflected the prevalence of realpolitik thought among the Georgian leaders for which their Armenian counterparts proved no match. Akakii I. Chkhenkeli, acting as head of state of the

Transcaucasian Federation even before official confirmation of his government on April 26, 1918, ordered Nazarbekian to evacuate Kars. On April 23 Chkhenkeli in a secret communication had notified General Vehib that the terms of Brest-Litovsk were now acceptable for the resumption of negotiations for peace and that he had issued orders to cease all hostilities and to commence withdrawal from Kars and the rest of Western Armenia. As refugees fled from the Kars region across the Akhurian River to Erevan, Turkish forces captured Kars on April 25–26. Once Chkhenkeli’s communications with Turkish authorities became known to the Armenian leaders in Tiflis and Erevan, the Dashnaktsutiun called for his resignation, and Aleksandr Khatisian, Hovhannes Kachaznuni, and Avetik Sahakian withdrew from his cabinet. The Georgian Mensheviks argued that Transcaucasian cooperation was necessary to maintain regional unity and, expressing their own opposition to Chkhenkeli, proposed Kachaznuni to head the Transcaucasian government. Yet the Dashnakist leaders, believing that Turkey would view Kachaznuni’s appointment as the rise of a “war cabinet,” declined the offer and instead decided to retain membership in Chkhenkeli’s cabinet.14

Having achieved a major military and diplomatic victory, Turkey offered to resume the peace negotiations at Batum. Chkhenkeli accepted the invitation and the Transcaucasian delegation departed for Batum with the clear objective of officially accepting the Brest-Litovsk treaty as a condition for peace. On May 11, 1918, during the opening session of the conference, Halil Bey Ottoman Minister of Justia representing his government at Batum, surprised the participants by declaring that since conditions had changed during the past month, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty would no longer serve as the basis for the peace negotiations. He demanded the surrender to Turkey of Batum, Alexandropol, Akhalkalak, Shirak, and Echmiadzin, as well as control over the Alexandropol-Kars and Alexandropol-Julfa rail lines. Events on the battlefields hardly necessitated such demands, for the Turkish forces proceeded to extend their control over these regions. While at Batum, however, General Otto von Lossow, present at the conference as one of the two German observers, had secretly agreed with the Georgian delegates to meet in Poti in preparation for the Georgian declaration of independence. The Georgians, concurring with von Lossow, considered secession from the Transcaucasian Federation and independence under German protection preferable to Turkish occupation. Germany, with interests in the Batum-Baku oil line and other natural resources (e.g., copper and manganese), agreed to provide military and economic assistance to independent Georgia.15

On May 26, during its final session, the Transcaucasian Seim adopted the Georgian resolution to dissolve itself, and within hours the Georgian National Council declared independence. The following day the Muslim

National Council met in Tiflis and declared the independence of “Eastern and Southern Transcaucasia,” followed by a declaration of the formation of the Republic of Azerbaijan on May 28. The Armenian leadership was divided on the issue of independence. When the National Council met on May 26, the Social Revolutionaries opposed independence, for it would expose the isolated Armenian state to Turkish attacks. The Social Democrats and the Armenian Democratic Party, however, faced with the inescapable realities, supported independence. The Dashnaktsutiun was also divided. Avetis Aharonian, Ruben Ter Minasian, and Artashes Babalian opposed independence, but Simon Vratsian and Khachatur Karjikian favored such a move. During a meeting in Tiflis, Khatisian and Kachaznuni agreed that under the circumstances Armenian preferences notwithstanding the National Council had no alternative but to opt for independence and establish a modus vivendi with Turkey. On May 28 the National Council agreed to send Khatisian and Kachaznuni to Batum to negotiate peace with Turkey. The following day, in an emergency meeting, the Dashnakist leaders agreed to declare the independence of the Republic of Armenia and appointed Kachaznuni minister-president. On May 30 in the midst of rapidly unfolding and confusing events the council issued its proclamation without mentioning the words “independence” or “republic.”16

THE FIRST GOVERNMENT

The leaders of the nascent Armenian republic were hardly prepared for the task of organizing a new government. As is often the case with leaders of revolutionary movements, with the exception of a handful of individuals (e.g., Khatisian, who had served as mayor of Tiflis),17 the emerging Armenian leaders had little or no experience in the management of government. The land they now hoped to govern lacked nearly all essential ingredients for a viable republic. Both the government and the population it was to govern lacked sufficient money, food, and military capability. About 50 percent of its people were war refugees in abject poverty. Nearly 60 percent of its territory was under foreign occupation. The town of Erevan, the designated capital of the new republic, had no particular appeal to the more cosmopolitan Armenian intellectuals and businessmen in Tiflis. Some even refused to move there. As historian Richard Pipes has commented, “No territory of the old Russian Empire had suffered greater losses from the First World War, and none was placed in a more desperate situation by the empire’s disintegration.”18

While in Batum the Armenian delegates were negotiating peace with Turkey, Turkish forces had moved on three fronts: southward from Alexandropol to Sardarapat (Sardarabad), eastward to Karakilisa, and