Материал: Payaslian S., The History of Armenia From the Origins to the Present

systematic efforts. Neither Wilson nor the Armenophile organizations were prepared for such a task.49 By the time Wilson finally launched his speaking tour across the country in September to campaign for membership in the League, much valuable time had passed. The opponents of the mandate, led by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, appeared on firmer ground; it was far easier to convince the American public that the United States must not become involved in additional “entangling alliances” and must not assume obligations abroad diverting resources needed at home. Policymakers in Washington preferred to avoid the difficult issues of mandate and recognition and found it more acceptable to send to Armenia surplus wheat left in the silos of the United States Grain Corporation.

The Armenian government dispatched Hovhannes Kachaznuni to the United States in October 1919, who, along with the Armenian Plenipotentiary Garegin Pastermajian (Armen Garo) in Washington, lobbied for economic support for the beleaguered republic. A few weeks later, General Hakob Bagratuni arrived in the United States with instructions from the Armenian Paris delegation to solicit military assistance. The Armenian missions headed by the former prime minister and General Bagratuni were received with much enthusiasm and optimism by Armenians and sympathetic societies, but by then it had become amply clear that U.S. officials in Washington would not translate such sympathies into actual policy. On November 19, 1919, the Senate rejected the Versailles Treaty, and on December 9, the United States officially withdrew from the peace conference. After the lengthy congressional debates and the tour by the Armenian mission in 1919, the republic received about 8 percent or $4.81 million worth of wheat of the total $57.78 million congressional allocation worldwide.50

MILITARY MATTERS AND CILICIA

Armenians welcomed outside assistance to alleviate the deplorable conditions in the republic. Military security, however, required more than piecemeal distribution of surplus wheat and clothes. For a while, as the United States debated the mandate issue and Britain withdrew from the Caucasus, the French appeared to be favorably disposed to engage in Cilicia, having contributed to the repatriation of Armenians from the Middle East to Cilicia. French policy in Cilicia, however, not only de facto delinked the region from the Republic of Armenia but also failed to provide the necessary support for the establishment of an Armenian state there. Despite their wartime policy of arming and training volunteer units (the Armenian region), like their British counterparts in the Caucasus, the French favored a strong military in the region and soon sought ways to cultivate friendly contacts with the Kemalist Nationalist Turks. In late

November 1919, François Georges-Picot met with Mustafa Kemal in Sivas, and during the two-day conference he attempted to convince Kemal that French intentions toward Turkey lacked the colonialist pretensions so characteristic of British policy. His government would negotiate commercial ventures, facilitate improvements in the Turkish military, and protect minorities. Kemal responded that the French military occupation of Cilicia was a most critical obstacle toward greater cooperation between the two nations and that so long as the French army remained on Turkish territory the Nationalist troops were ready to sacrifice their lives for the unity and liberation of their country.51 Turkish Nationalists commenced their attacks on French military posts in Cilicia and eventually forced their withdrawal from the region beginning in early 1920. Its military failures notwithstanding, the French military had enabled the Kemalists to establish their military supremacy in Cilicia. The French, like the other Allied Powers, believed that a strong Kemalist army could serve as a buffer against Bolshevik expansionism.

The resolution of Armenian issues whether in Cilicia or the Caucasus ultimately depended on the outcome of the Russian civil war. The British Foreign Office emphasized the necessity of securing a buffer zone between revolutionary Russia and its southern neighbors and accordingly advocated recognition of the republics in the Caucasus to contain the spread of Bolshevism. This policy would entail substantial expenditures in economic and military assistance regardless if it favored one or all three republics. The War Office, however, stressed that British support for Denikin’s army would incur fewer obligations for the task.52 The Allied Supreme Council heard both British arguments on January 19, 1920, and after a contentious deliberation, it approved the transfer of ammunition and food to the three Transcaucasian republics. The Supreme Council, which had granted recognition to Azerbaijan and Georgia on January 10, finally agreed to extend recognition to the Republic of Armenia during its January 19 session. U.S. recognition followed on April 23, after two months of vacillation. Significantly, Allied recognition came nearly two years after the declaration of the Republic of Armenia in May 1918.53

LONDON, SAN REMO, AND SÈVRES

By April 1920 Armenian hopes for a united state inclusive of Sivas, Kharpert, Diarbekir, and Cilicia appeared quite unrealistic. The Turkish Nationalist army was in a stronger position than during the war and seemed determined to gain control Cilicia. At the London Conference (February 12 to April 10, 1920), in preparing the treaty with Turkey, Britain and the other European powers saw no need to make major alterations

regarding Armenia except to provide the existing Armenian state access to a port on the Black Sea. A corridor to Batum as an international port would be feasible if the League of Nations assumed supervisory responsibilities. Having agreed on the impossibility of “Greater Armenia,” the conference formed a commission to examine the remaining Armenian territorial issues. In mid-February the commission heard the Armenian delegation, headed by Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar Pasha, with mixed results. The delegation was encouraged, however, by the French ambassador’s promise that France “would never abandon the Armenians” in Cilicia and would secure for Armenia access to the sea.54

Before completing the Turkish treaty, the London Conference took a number of positive steps but failed to provide clear guidelines regarding their actual implementation. With respect to protection of minorities and war reparations, the conference insisted on including in the treaty provisions for the protection of minority rights and required that the Turkish government restore Armenian goods and properties and nullify the Law of Abandoned Properties. The conference, however, limited its claims to indemnification for Allied expenditures, thus ignoring the issue of reparations for Armenian victims since the outbreak of war.55 Its successes and failures aside, a central feature of the London Conference was that the Allied Powers resorted to maneuvering the League of Nations into addressing those issues that they were not willing to resolve. They received a positive response from SecretaryGeneral Eric Drummond confirming the willingness of the League to examine the proposal that it assume the responsibilities of a mandate for Armenia but with the understanding that the organization could not quickly develop the institutional mechanisms necessary for such a task. The Allied Conference at London promised to resume the negotiations at San Remo in April.

The San Remo Conference (April 19–26, 1920) finalized the authorization of the mandates but, preoccupied with matters pertaining to the control of oilfields in the Middle East, it paid scant attention to the Armenian question. Under the existing conditions, the Allied Powers could not include provisions they could not implement. Accordingly, they reiterated the necessity of the League’s involvement to address the Armenian issue. Yet it was also clear that the League could not act effectively in this area without the moral, financial, and military support of the Allied Powers. On April 20, after calculations of costs and benefits on the extent of military involvement required in the Ottoman territories and Armenia, the Allies proposed to the Wilson administration that the United States directly participate in sharing the burden of Armenian security. Armenia’s boundaries would remain unchanged until such time as Wilson either accepted the mandate or intervened as an arbiter.56

The peace treaty was finally presented to Turkey on May 11, 1920. Its provisions included, inter alia, Turkey’s recognition of Armenian independence,

submission of proposal to Wilson that he draw the international boundaries of Armenia, nullification of the Abandoned Properties Law and transfer of properties thus acquired to their rightful owners, and prosecution of persons responsible for the massacres. Turkish condemnation of the humiliating treaty was not surprising. Nevertheless, on July 22, 1920, Turkey agreed to sign the treaty and to send a delegation to Sèvres. By then, however, the constant attacks by the Bolshevik, Azerbaijani, and Turkish forces had so enervated the Armenian government as to render its physical survival highly unsustainable.57

THE BUREAU GOVERNMENT

In September 1919, during a secret meeting in Erevan, the Armenian Bolsheviks had organized the Armenian Committee (Armenkom) within the structure of the Russian Communist Party. Unlike in Baku, Bolshevism had not yet established a strong foothold in the country. In 1919 there were about 500 Bolsheviks in all of Armenia, and they lacked any significant organizational apparatus for mass agitation and mobilization, except in the region of Alexandropol. To avert radicalization of Bolshevism, the Dashnakist government at first resorted to co-optation and allowed Bolshevik sympathizers to hold jobs in government and schools.58 In January 1920 the Bolsheviks formed the Armenian Communist Party.59 The Dashnakist government for its part became less tolerant after January. While the nation was celebrating the long-awaited Allied recognition of the republic, the Bolsheviks launched a massive propaganda campaign vilifying the Allied Powers and their Dashnakist “collaborators” in Erevan. The latter responded by arresting several Bolshevik activists and by expelling others from the country. These tensions culminated in the “May uprising” in Alexandropol, where for two weeks the Bolsheviks threatened to take over the city as a first step toward overthrowing the Erevan government.60

In addition, relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan had escalated into armed clashes again. In February 1920, after a lukewarm attempt at negotiations, the British-appointed governor-general Mountainous Karabagh and Zangezur, Khosrov Bek Sultanov mobilized Azerbaijani forces from Baku to Karabagh. Armenian units under the direction of Hovakim Stepanian and Arsen Mikayelian responded by preparing their own battle plans in Karabagh, while General Garegin Nzhdeh (Garegin Ter Harutunian) organized his troops in Zangezur, gaining control over eastern Zangezur by the end of March. In Karabagh, however, Azerbaijani forces sacked Shushi and nearly thirty villages nearby. The Armenian troops under Dro could not withstand the combined powers of the Red and Azerbaijani armies and their Turkish supporters. Between May 22 and

24, after consultation with Nzhdeh, Dro withdrew to Zangezur. Two days later the Tenth Assembly of Karabagh declared the Sovietization of Karabagh.61

Local Armenian leaders in different parts of Armenia criticized the Erevan government and its officials in Karabagh for their disastrous policies. The loss of Karabagh posed as much a threat to the Republic of Armenia as the Turkish forces amassing on its western front. After the loss of Karabagh, the Erevan government could no longer afford such accommodationist policies, as the Red Army’s advance had emboldened the Armenian Bolsheviks. In Erevan, the Bureau of Dashnaktsutiun decided to replace the more moderate Khatisian by the Bureau Government headed by Hamazasp Ohandjanian as prime minister and Ruben Ter-Minasian as minister of internal and military affairs. After confirming the new cabinet on May 5, 1920, the Khorhrdaran recessed for a month. The Dashnakist government resorted to force to suppress and contain the Bolshevik uprising in Alexandropol, but Revkom-organized rebellions continued to flare in other areas, such as Kars, Sarikamish, Bayazid, Dilijan, and Shamshadin.62

Having seemingly crushed the Bolshevik rebellions, the Bureau Government resumed the onerous task of constructing and strengthening the nation’s economy and administrative agencies, and in the process it also stressed the Armenianization of civilian and military institutions. Armenianization revived the Armenian culture and language on the independent soil of Armenia; the nation could finally repair its mutilated identity if not pacify its tormented soul. The Bureau Government also considered the question of citizenship, electoral reforms and civic participation, demarcation of local administrative jurisdictions, distribution and ownership of land, bureaucratic reforms to eliminate corruption, and improvements in land and water communication networks. The failure to resolve the economic crisis as a result of the Azerbaijani blockade and oil shortages, however, severely impaired virtually all government programs and paralyzed the nation’s economy. The government perforce continued to negotiate concessional terms for contracts with domestic and foreign enterprises and launched a major campaign, headed by Khatisian, for the “Independence Loan” (supplemented by the “Gold Fund”) throughout the diasporan communities.63

During the summer of 1920, the Bureau Government tried to recover from the crisis of the May uprising and commenced military operations in several troubled areas to insure internal stability. It ordered the military to stabilize the Zangibasar region and to secure the communication lines. A similar military campaign began in Peniak, northeast of Olti, to control the coal fields, and by late June Armenian forces had occupied Peniak and a large part of Olti, within reach of Erzerum across the border. Emboldened by the military successes in Zangibasar and Olti, the hard-liners in the Bureau Government argued that further military action was necessary now toward Vedibasar and Sharur-Nakhijevan in the south and southeast to liquidate pockets of