Материал: Konrad Muzyka Russian Forces in the Western Military District

Air and air defense forces

Russia has deployed and developed a robust network of strategicand tactical-level SAM capabilities that fall under the command of the 44th Air Defence Division. The division comprises the 183rd Air Defence Regiment, the 1545th Air Defence Regiment, and the 81st Radio-Technical Regiment.

In early 2019 the 1545th Air Defence Regiment was rearmed with a regimental set (two battalions) of the S-400s, which are stationed just north of Gvardeysk. The 183rd Regiment fields four S-400 battalions, which are deployed in the western parts of the oblast,85 and two S-300PS battalions just north and south of the Chernyakovsk Air Base.86 The conversion of the 1545th also indicates a definite removal of the S-300V SAM system, which the unit previously operated, from the oblast (or perhaps it is a confirmation of the system’s non-existence). It is unclear whether there are plans to redeploy it into Kaliningrad; however, from an operational perspective, such a system would undeniably improve the ground forces’ ability to operate in a contested environment.

In terms of aviation, in 2018 Russia opened the airbase in Chkalovsk, which was closed for modernization in 2013. The works involved extending the runway, replacing its surface, increasing the apron’s size, and installing new navigation and communication systems.

Surprisingly, imagery intelligence (IMINT) shows that the resurfacing concluded in 2016 and no construction works occurred at the base for two years. It is unclear what caused the delay, but one would expect an airbase modernization to take less than five years, especially given the deteriorating security environment after Russia’s seizure of Crimea and its operations in Eastern Ukraine. Currently, aircraft at Chkalovsk are parked in the open air, because no new shelters have been built.

It remains to be seen whether the Chernyakhovsk airbase will undergo a similar upgrade or whether it will be used as a reserve airbase. As of mid 2020, fixed-wing combat assets were stationed in Chkalovsk.

85One is near Mamonovo by the Polish border; one is south and one is north of Baltyisk; and one is near Yantarny.

86Центр АСТ, В Калининградской области развернуты уже шесть дивизионов зенитной ракетной системы С-400, Mar. 12, 2019, https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3566812.html.

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Russian aviation assets in the Kaliningrad Oblast are centered around the 132nd SAD87, which comprises the 4th Guards Naval Assault Air Regiment, the 689th Guards MshAP, a UAV company, and the 369th OSVP. 88

The naval attack aviation regiment was originally stationed in Chernyakovsk. Between 2016 and 2018 it received eight Su-30SMs, which partially replaced and augmented the squadron of Su-24M/MR aircraft.89

The 689th MshAP is equipped with about 20 Su-27P/UB fighters, some of which were diverted from the 790th IAP’s base as it was converting to Su-35s. Ultimately these Su-27s should also be replaced by modern platforms; however, this seems unlikely in the medium term. The combat structure of the division will rest on four squadrons equipped with a mix of Su-30SMs, Su-24s, and Su-27s.

Rotary-wing assets are subordinated to the 396th OSVP from Donskoye. It is composed of the 125th OVE (Mi-24s and Mi-8Ts), 396th OKPLVE (Ka-27(M)s, Ka-27Ps, and Ka-29s), and the 398th OVTE. The last subunit provides VIP airlift for Baltic Sea Fleet personnel as well as tactical airlift for ground forces.

87 A June 2020 Krasnaya Zvezda report stated that rotary-wing aviation assets operating in the Kaliningrad Oblast are subordinate to the 34th SAD. No mention of the 132nd SAD was made therein. It is possible that the 132nd SAD has indeed morphed into the 34th SAD. However, neither has this information been officially confirmed, nor has the author confirmed the veracity of this claim from other openly available sources.

Владислав Павлютки, Стражи неба и моря, Красная Звезда, June 8, 2020, http://redstar.ru/strazhi-neba-i- morya/.

88Regnum, В Крыму и в Калининграде формируют две новые авиационные дивизии, Regnum, Oct. 30, 2019, https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2763916.html.

89Piotr Butowski claims that all MR variants were withdrawn from service and replaced by a Forpost UAV detachment. Piotr Butowski, Flashpoint Russia: Russia’s Air Power: Capabilities and Structure (Vienna: Harpia Publishing, 2019), p. 111.

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Ongoing Modernization, Finished

Reform

The current composition of conventional components of the Russian armed forces deployed in the Western Military District presents a force that is capable of conducting operations across all domains and the entire spectrum of warfare. Table 4 shows a summary of Russian forces in the Western Military District.

Table 4. Summary of Russian forces in the Western Military District

Source: Author’s calculation.

Since 2014, the Russian armed forces have demonstrated the capability to undertake special forces-led irregular warfare missions, high-tempo maneuver warfare with armor, mechanized forces and artillery forces, effective air operations, and seaand air-led long-range conventional precision strikes. An indirect threat to use nuclear weapons was used to advance the state’s interests and deter potentially hostile actions against Russia in February and March

2014.

A decision to move away from the brigade concept towards heavier division-led ground operations highlights the difference in threat assessments between the current minister of defense, Sergei Shoigu, and those of his predecessor, Anatoly Serdyukov. The latter expected future wars to be limited to local conflicts akin to that in Georgia in 2008. The MoD view is that

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conflict with NATO is possible, although unlikely, and that, given the alliance’s expansion towards Russia, Moscow needs to be prepared for large-scale operations using regiments and divisions as its main maneuver forces.

The predominant developments focus on the creation of heavy forces that can engage a nearpeer adversary close to Russian borders and that can deliver a preponderance of power in the initial stages of conflict and thus bring it to a swift conclusion, or at least place Russia in a favorable position for negotiation. That said, lessons learned from the Syrian campaign also seem to be incorporated into the armed forces. The creation of light and ultra-light battalions seeks to further enhance mobility and maneuverability of land force sub-units, especially in areas where other formations seem to be too heavy or require significant logistics support.

NATO, however, is not the sole enemy “at the gates.” The push to establish new regiments, divisions, and armies around Ukraine since 2014 clearly indicates concerns about possible conflict escalation in this southwestern strategic direction. At the same time, these forces could be redeployed to Belarus or farther north near the Baltic States, if required, in order to create favorable correlations of force ratios in targeted battlespaces.

Expansion of divisions, within both the ground and airborne forces, is stymied by a lack of manpower, appropriate equipment, modernization priorities, and—perhaps the most important—financial considerations. The process of expanding VDV to a historic threeregiment configuration is slow. The 1st GTA has two maneuver divisions, whereas its Cold War predecessor had three. Similarly, each division was to have six regiments, but it only fields five.

It is Russian policy to build up and maintain forces to fight a conventional war in its neighborhood and sustain enough capability to achieve the immediate deterrent effect through the peacetime location of military units and capabilities that go with them. This pertains not only to strictly offensive operations but to defensive ones as well. A surge in air defense assets deployed in the Western MD in recent years will significantly hinder air operations of any conventional opponent. Long-range assets also ensure that Russia can deliver high-precision strikes on strategic assets to cripple an opposing force’s command and control.

To support such operations, in recent years Russia has grown its logistics and support capabilities to provide a constant flow of materiel into the battlefield, evacuate and repair equipment when necessary, and undertake deception operations in terms of movement and assembly of Russian units.

The reorganization of the units stationed in the Western Military District has largely concluded. Although some tactical-level innovations based on combat experiences could be implemented across ground forces, the main fighting and support components are established. There nevertheless are weak areas that will demand addressing. Restructuring of Russian assets in the Kaliningrad Oblast is ongoing, but the pace is sluggish.

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Although St. Petersburg is heavily defended with multiple SAM sites, ground force elements would need to be significantly reinforced even if they were to conduct effective defensive operations—and much more so if they were to undertake offensive missions in the Baltic States.

In August or September 2021 Russia and Belarus will conduct the quadrennial Zapad-21 strategic-operational exercise. This will provide insights into how Russia’s threat assessment has changed in the last four years and how it plans to fight a war with a near-peer adversary on its borders. The political crisis that erupted following the August 2020 presidential elections in Belarus and statements coming from the Belarusian president, Alexander Lukashenko, blaming NATO and the EU for political upheaval,90 again indicate that NATO will once more be the main target of the exercise. Numerous calls to Russia for military and political assistance have left Lukashenko weakened in relation to Russia and in the face of Moscow’s demands to expedite the merger of the two countries.91 Zapad-21 will present an ideal opportunity for the Russian troops to stay in Belarus. If this happens, NATO’s military posture in Poland and the

Baltic States will need to adapt to the challenge of a significantly expanded battlefield (from Belarus to Kaliningrad) and decreased deployment time for Russian forces.

90“Belarus: Rival rallies as Lukashenko claims NATO deployed to border,” Deutsche Welle, Aug. 16, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/belarus-rival-rallies-as-lukashenko-claims-nato-deployed-to-border/a-54586752.

91Konrad Muzyka, Endgame? Russia to deepen military co-operation with Belarus, Rochan Consulting, Sept. 16, 2020, https://rochan-consulting.com/endgame-russia-to-deepen-military-co-operation-with-belarus/.

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