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position on the Karabagh question. The Lisbon summit of the OSCE in December 1996 proved pivotal. The declaration issued at Lisbon, which reaffirmed the Azerbaijani position but reportedly without consultation with Erevan or Stepanakert, accepted the principle of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, while permitting Karabagh autonomy within Azerbaijan. In other words, the Lisbon declaration rejected Armenian claims to national independence for Karabagh as a sovereign nation-state or as a reintegrated constituent region of the Republic of Armenia. The Ter Petrosyan government changed its policy from rejecting the Lisbon declaration to a potential compromise. In September 1997, during a televised press conference, he referred to the available options regarding Karabagh and proposed to accept the piecemeal approach to the negotiations as proposed by the Minsk Group.27 He maintained that the status quo no longer appeared tenable, nor was Erevan in a position to extend formal recognition to Karabagh as a sovereign government. Further, he noted, a comprehensive or “package” solution—whereby Karabagh would return to Baku all the conquered territories, with the exception of the Lachin corridor, while the blockade imposed on Armenia would be lifted, international peacekeeping forces would be deployed at the Karabagh-Azerbaijan border, and the refugees would return home—was not practicable. Given that both Karabagh and Azerbaijan had rejected the package approach, Ter Petrosyan argued, the resolution of the Karabagh conflict required a step- by-step process in determining the status of the region, a proposal that had been accepted by Azerbaijan. In essence, this latter approach would forced Karabagh to return all the lands it had gained during the war, except perhaps the Lachin corridor, while Karabagh itself would be granted an autonomous status under the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan.28
The Copenhagen conference in December 1997 further solidified Ter Petrosyan’s step-by-step policy implying “self-rule” for Karabagh as favored by the Minsk Group. Ter Petrosyan’s position assumed a positive response from the Azerbaijani president Heydar Aliyev and showed unrealistic confidence in Baku’s willingness to negotiate as equal partners. Would the Azerbaijani civilian leadership and the military command permit self rule for Armenians in Karabagh? Would an agreement at the negotiating table regarding the Lachin corridor in fact guarantee the region’s security against future Azerbaijani attacks? The ensuing crisis between Ter Petrosyan and his supporters, on one hand, and the opposition including Arkady Ghukasyan and Kocharyan, on the other, revealed deep divisions at the highest levels of governments in Erevan and Stepanakert. By the end of January 1998, the tensions had paralyzed the Ter Petrosyan government as rumors spread of an imminent military takeover. The situation deteriorated further with news of assassination attempts against a
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number of government officials and the resignation of some key supporters of Ter Petrosyan. Foreign Minister Arzumanyan resigned on February 2, followed by chairman of the Central Bank, Bagrat Asatryan. The final collapse of the government came when more than forty ANM members in the National Assembly, including Speaker Ara Sahakyan, withdrew from the party. Most of them sided with the Union of Erkrapah faction, the group representing the veterans of the Karabagh war and led by the defense minister, Vazgen Sargsyan.29
Ter Petrosyan’s willingness to compromise on the status of Karabagh and the strongly negative reaction to it among his close advisers and by different groups in Armenia and the diaspora defined the political parameters of the debate. Opponents to this policy shift included Prime Minister Kocharyan, Interior Minister Serge Sargsyan, and Defense Minister Vazgen Sargsyan, the former two who had led the war against Azerbaijan. Ter Petrosyan may have sought a practicable resolution considering the geopolitical realities confronting Erevan, but the Armenian blood spelled for Karabagh after seventy years of Azerbaijani rule was too fresh to be subjected to political compromises. Although for those in the decision-making circles in Erevan opting for a compromise represented a rational policy, the emotional content of the issue would not permit the leadership the luxury of such options. Further, by 1997 Ter Petrosyan had lost political credibility in various areas of domestic policy. He had arrested the Dashnaktsutiun leaders in 1994, the elections in 1996 were rigged, corruption permeated the entire system, and his government had failed to ameliorate the economic situation. These tensions were exacerbated by the foreign policy crisis after the Lisbon summit, which inevitably undermined the legitimacy of Ter Petrosyan’s political leadership. Prime Minister Kocharyan and some members of the cabinet forced Ter Petrosyan’s resignation in February 1998.30
By the time Ter Petrosyan left office, the republic appeared in desperate need for a leader who possessed sufficient moral authority to inspire public confidence in the political system. Neither Ter Petrosyan nor his successor possessed leadership “charismata,” that “transcendent call by a divine being, believed in by both the person called and those with whom he had to deal in exercising his calling.”31 Ter Petrosyan had emerged as a member of the Karabagh Committee, and by the “virtue of the mission” the legitimacy of the group’s claims against the discredited Soviet regime conferred legitimacy on his leadership as well. A charismatic leader, however, according to the sociologist Max Weber, must repeatedly prove the fulfillment of his mission; otherwise, his “charismatic claim” is dismissed if his mission is not realized and therefore no longer recognized by the
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people.32 A key issue concerning the newly independent state was the quality of the emerging political leadership and their parties. As evidenced time and again in the developing world, the absence of established institutions that are responsive to public demands in the process of decolonization creates a political vacuum that is often filled by authoritarian personal rulers that rely on strong, monopolistic-patrimonial institutional arrangements to safeguard their position. Once in power, the foremost priority of the top leadership is to establish the legitimacy of the regime, and only after a certain degree of stability is secured can the government devote its resources to such public goods as welfare, justice, and free and fair elections.33 In addition to leadership, effective political parties are essential for democratization. After the fall of the Soviet one-party system in Armenia, more than seventy self-proclaimed political parties arose, most of which lacked the leadership and organizational wherewithal of actual political parties. They were, in fact, what in the West is considered “interest groups.” The absence of free political space and competition in the Soviet Union had hindered the development of independent parties, and Armenians saw the collapse of the Communist Party as an opportunity for political activism. At the same time, however, they distrusted party organizations because of the close association of such concepts with the Communist Party.34 Most emerging political parties were weak organizationally, but the few led by powerful individuals mustered sufficient support and developed personal authoritarian leadership. A central question in this process is the institutionalization of the political parties and their meaningful participation in policymaking as distinguished from the transitory political and ideological predilections of their individual leaders. Institutionalization requires that political parties transcend their individual members’ proclivities and survive beyond the lifetimes of their leaders.35 Most of the new political parties failed the test of institutionalization as they disappeared after their leaders withdrew from the political arena. The Armenian National Movement party, for example, survived as long as its leader, Ter Petrosyan, could win and maintain the presidency. Of the seventy political parties at the time of independence, only a small number have endured, including the Republican Party, the Justice Bloc (consisting of the Republic Party, the National Democratic Union, the Democratic Party, the National Democratic Party, and the People’s Party), the Rule of Law Party, the Dashnaktsutiun, the National Unity Party, and the United Labor Party.
THE KOCHARYAN GOVERNMENT
Born in Stepanakert, Karabagh, Robert Kocharyan received a degree in engineering at the Erevan State Polytechnic Institute. In the 1980s he served in a
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number of positions in the Communist Party of Karabagh and won a seat in the first parliament of Karabagh in 1991. He became prime minister of Karabagh in 1992 and president in 1994. He won the first presidential elections in Karabagh in November 1996, and in 1997 President Ter Petrosyan appointed him as prime minister of Armenia. After Ter Petrosyan’s resignation in February 1998, Kocharyan won the presidential elections held in March against former Communist chief Karen Demirchyan.
His transfer from Stepanakert to Erevan may indeed have been a rare case in the history of modern governments. Kocharyan’s appointment as prime minister symbolized the significance of Karabagh to Armenian politics. As president, however, he had to address a host of policy issues, most prominently the economic situation at home (e.g., shortages in resources, unemployment, infrastructural development) and improved relations with the diasporan communities. In foreign policy, and closely related to domestic issues, his administration had to find ways to remove the blockade imposed by Turkey and Azerbaijan and to cultivate closer ties with societies that could potentially stimulate economic development and facilitate modernization. The Kocharyan government thus hoped to rely on Armenian diasporan communities with large and active organizations to lobby for economic support for the homeland, as in matters of trade and economic aid. In contrast to Ter Petrosyan, Kocharyan also promised to return the issue of international recognition of the genocide to the national agenda as a key component in the nation’s foreign policy. The Ter Petrosyan government had taken steps to normalize relations with Turkey but to no avail. Upon entering office in 1998, the Kocharyan government had the unenviable task of continuing the policy, as inherited from his predecessor, of pursuing normalization with Turkey, on one hand, and recognition of the genocide, on the other hand.
The results of the parliamentary elections in May appeared to strengthen Kocharyan’s hand. Defense Minister Vazgen Sargsyan and the former Communist Party boss Karen Demirchyan allied under the Union Alliance, and upon election they emerged as leaders in the National Assembly, Sargsyan securing the post of prime minister and Demirchyan, as the new Speaker of the Assembly. These parliamentary elections had enormous significance for the nation and its political institutions. The results were seen as a referendum on President Kocharyan’s first year in office. Further, the elections, as promised by the Kocharyan government, in general seemed to have been free of egregious violations, in contrast to the repeated charges of electoral irregularities in previous elections. Although the electoral process was not without certain shortcomings, the elections appeared to have enhanced the credibility of the Kocharyan government, as nearly all international observers expressed satisfaction with the process.
The legitimacy of a nation’s political institutions and leadership rests on the integrity of the electoral process and the ability to deliver public goods
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and services. Recurring failures to safeguard electoral integrity eventually undermine public confidence in, and hence the legitimacy of, the system. Diminishing legitimacy affects not only the domestic citizenry, which in the case of Armenia had ample cause for cynicism toward politics, but it also affects international confidence in the political culture and system. For better or worse, international perceptions and opinion regarding Armenia mattered because of its need for foreign trade and investments— issues closely related to its international prestige (e.g., as its membership in the Council of Europe).36 The Armenian political system appeared to be in the process of developing some rudimentary components of procedural democracy. As Armenia’s ambassador to Austria, Jivan Tabibian, has observed, “State institutions must exhibit a triple form of autonomy, that is, ultimately, non-dependence on institutions outside the country, on nonstate institutions inside the country and on the idiosyncrasies of the leadership at a given moment.”37 The institutionalization of procedural democracy was a first step toward strengthening the autonomy and hence enhancing the integrity of the policymaking institutions.
By the middle of 1999, a small number of political parties had emerged with significant representation in the National Assembly. These included Unity Alliance led by Andranik Margaryan, the Party of Stability led by Hovhannes Hovhannesyan, the Communist Party led by Sergey Badalyan, the Party of Right and Unity headed by Artashes Geghamyan, Orinats Erkir led by Arthur Baghdasaryan, National Democratic Union led by Vazgen Manukyan, and the Dashnaktsutiun led by Hrand Margaryan. Parties that failed to win seats in the 1999 elections included Union of Socialist Parties, Strong Fatherland, Self-Determination Union, Armenian National Movement, Ramkavar Liberal Democrats, and Shamiram.38 The elections of 1999 signified political leadership stability, despite initial concerns about the succession process from Ter Petrosyan to Kocharyan. The transition was the first since independence in 1991, and given Ter Petrosyan’s controversial leadership and resignation, there were no guarantees for stability. The smooth succession augured well for Kocharyan, but the legitimacy of his government would depend on the political will of policymakers to manage the levers of political economy so as to deliver to the citizenry a more egalitarian distribution of resources than had been possible under the previous administration.
DEMOCRACY AND WOMEN
What mattered after the elections was the extent to which procedural democracy could facilitate the development of substantive democracy. Issues pertaining to women’s rights may prove to be the litmus test for the degree of democratization Armenian social and political institutions can