Материал: Payaslian S., The History of Armenia From the Origins to the Present

crisis significantly lowered the standard of living for a large sector of the population. In late 1992 the average pay for employees was estimated at about $25 per month, yet a family of four required at minimum about $200 a month for a decent livelihood. According to a 1996 survey conducted by the Ministry of Statistics (currently the National Statistical Service), 55 percent of the population in Armenia considered themselves poor, 28 percent very poor, and more than 10 percent extremely poor. The severe economic difficulties led to budgetary imbalances. Budget revenues fell to mere 15 percent of GDP in the period 1992 to 1994, as the tax base nearly collapsed, and, making matters worse, shrinking state expenditures caused a severe drop (nearly 50 percent from 1992 to 1996) in public social programs.2

In efforts to disengage the nation’s economy from the institutions inherited from the Soviet regime, the Ter Petrosyan government relied on privatization and price liberalization policies, effectively ending price controls by October 1994. This was combined with the privatization of kolkhoz (collective farms) and sovkhoz (state farms) lands, and nearly 70 percent of state-owned apartments were privatized by early 1996. In 1992 Pavel Khaltakchyan, head of the Committee of Privatization and Management of State Property, identified three stages for the process of privatization, which he expected to be completed within ten years. The first stage involved the privatization of the food and light industries, followed by the transportation industry, and finally by the heavy industry. The state would retain control over strategic industrial sectors for national security purposes. The government’s economic liberalization policies were supported by $65 million in assistance from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 1995 for structural market reforms beginning the following year.3

A policy issue that required greatest attention was the 1988 earthquake regions of Spitak and Gumri. The Ter Petrosyan government failed to introduce a viable reconstruction program, and as late as December 1993, according to official reports no more than between 30 and 40 percent of the initial plans for reconstruction had been implemented, although unofficial sources placed the figure at 20 percent. The government, with Russian and diasporan assistance, had planned to construct houses, schools, and hospitals, but scarcity of funds limited the nation’s construction capacity to 30 percent of its potential, of which only a small portion was allocated to the earthquake zone. Nearly 58,000 families lacked permanent housing and 400,000 people required some form of relief assistance.4

Further, an estimated 334,000 Armenian refugees had fled the bloodshed in Azerbaijan, constituting nearly 10 percent of the population in Armenia by the end of 1993. Of these refugees, about 130,000 received some form of international humanitarian assistance, which covered approximately 30 percent of their basic needs. About 100,000 were housed

in 300 communal facilities, living in what one UN representative referred to as “atrocious” conditions. Taken together, the earthquake of 1988 and the war in Karabagh had left about 30 percent of the population in Armenia homeless.5 The deteriorating educational system fueled additional concerns regarding the health of the economy and the future of the republic as government funding dropped by more than 50 percent since independence. The monthly salary for teachers in secondary education was no more than $20.6 The economic difficulties compelled Ter Petrosyan to turn to the diasporan communities for assistance, but he was aware of the dilemma that his reliance on diaspora would create. Would the Ter Petrosyan government feel obligated to permit diasporan Armenians a voice in policymaking?

The complexities involved in Armenia-diaspora relations became apparent soon after the initial period of triumphant jubilation. The Ter Petrosyan government insisted on the priority of economically and diplomatically strengthening the republic and considered the diasporan communities as a source for financial and technological support. Particularly essential was the financial support extended to Armenia during its worst economic crisis between 1991 and 1994. Armenian churches and charitable organizations across the diaspora donated millions of dollars’ worth of supplies, ranging from blankets to medical equipments. For example, assistance by the United Armenian Fund included the Winter Fuel Project in 1993 worth $21 million, plus clothing, construction materials, books, computers, medical instruments, and pharmaceuticals, with the total value of nearly $60 million for the period from 1990 to 1993.7

While the two diasporan political parties, the Hnchakians and the Ramkavars, and their associate organizations more or less cooperated with Ter Petrosyan, fundamental differences emerged by 1993 between his government and the Hay Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutiun (Armenian Revolutionary Federation, ARF) on matters pertaining to Karabagh and the Armenian Genocide. The Dashnaktsutiun demanded either direct reunification of Karabagh with Armenia or Erevan’s formal recognition of Karabagh’s independent status. The Dashnaktsutiun underscored the close relationship between Turkish recognition of the genocide and the territorial issues of the Armenian lands under Turkish control and Nakhijevan under Azerbaijani control, on one hand, and the conflict in Karabagh, on the other. In contrast, Ter Petrosyan and the Armenian National Movement insisted on the physical security of Armenia as their immediate objective; concerns regarding the sovereignty of Karabagh were secondary. In an interview, Ter Petrosyan stated that no more than 10 percent of the diasporan community opposed his government. He attributed the tensions between Armenia and the diaspora to misperceptions and misunderstanding. “There will always be a mutual lack of

understanding and trust,” he emphasized, “so long as the Diaspora leadership does not come to terms with the reality that policy is determined here, on this land.” Further, he noted, the diasporan opposition believed it had been “deprived of its just place of power.” However, Ter Petrosyan argued, the diasporan leaders had failed to assess accurately the situation in Armenia and in the early stages of the anti-Soviet movement “the Diaspora kept its distance from the movement . . . . They did not understand it, didn’t participate in it certainly, and finally adopted a negative stance.” The diasporan communities, he maintained, “have remained within the confines of the Armenian community, in a manifestation of the ghetto mentality.” In fact, he concluded, while the diasporan communities propagated various interpretations of his policies, the political and economic realities were that policy decisions pertaining to Karabagh and relations with Russia and Turkey “often depended on very simple realities: How many tons of wheat are in our stores, how many bullets we have, how many cisterns of diesel fuel are available to our tanks.”8

During his tour of the United States in August 1994, Ter Petrosyan met with President Bill Clinton, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of Defense Anthony Perry, and several members of Congress to discuss economic aid and the Karabagh crisis. Visiting the Armenian community in Detroit, he summarized Armenia’s foreign policy. Concerning national security, he stressed the importance of a “balanced foreign policy” toward Russia, Turkey, and Iran. He pointed out that given the domestic and external difficulties, it was essential that Armenia’s foreign policy in this toughest of neighborhoods be based on realism and prudence. Having gained independence for the second time in this century, he maintained, the current government of Armenia could not allow the loss of the hard-won independence. The pursuit of a peaceful resolution of the conflict, however, the president noted, would most likely require certain compromises by both parties, including a willingness on Armenians’ part to withdraw from territories captured beyond Karabagh proper. The government of Azerbaijan had acknowledged its inability to achieve its objectives through military force and realized that the military option was no longer viable. Therefore, he added, it was in Armenia’s best interest to negotiate a comprehensive plan for the peaceful resolution of this conflict now before it escalated into a war of far greater magnitude than thus far witnessed.

The Dashnaktsutiun reacted with intense hostility toward Ter Petrosyan’s statement. He in turn accused the party of terrorist and other illegal activities to overthrow the government and issued a decree on December 28, 1994, to close the operations of the party in Erevan and its affiliate organizations and to arrest their leaders. This heavy-handed reaction to political opposition not only reminded the nation of the

Stalinist legacy of Soviet dictatorial rule but also violated both domestic and international human rights law. In 1992 the Armenian government had become a signatory to various international human rights instruments, including the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, all of which prohibit such repressive measures against individuals and political organizations.

These political and economic, domestic and international challenges only intensified after the reelection in 1996. Perhaps the first fundamental problem involved the accusation that at least in some parts of the country the electoral process was rigged. As protest demonstrations spread, the situation could have spiraled into bloodshed, but the military reacted to the postelection violence by dispatching tanks to the streets of Erevan, further undermining the legitimacy of the regime. Ter Petrosyan therefore came under severe criticism at home and in the diasporan communities for his government’s authoritarian measures, as in 1994, to silence the opposition.

The economic difficulties amplified the problem of political legitimacy. The fact that the “shadow economy” or the black market represented an estimated 35 to 40 percent of the nation’s GDP accentuated the ties between corruption and the political system. The new leadership, however, sought to encourage the development of free market economy and to win the confidence of international investors, as indicated by the appointment of a number of cabinet members who had served as ambassadors to western capitals. For example, the newly appointed prime minister, Armen Sargisyan, had held the post of ambassador to London. Alexander Arzumanyan, appointed minister of foreign affairs, was ambassador to Washington and subsequently to the United Nations. Minister of Trade and Tourism Garnik Nanagulyan was ambassador to Ottawa. In the absence of adequate domestic resources, international trade remained the only avenue to economic growth, and the extent to which the nation’s economy could improve its trade balance remained a significant question. The trade deficit rose from $178 million in 1994 to $565 million, or 30 percent of GDP, in 1996, and to $672 million in 1998. The nation’s foreign debt increased from 31 percent of GDP in 1994 to 41.8 percent in 1997. Although that figure dropped slightly to 38.1 in 1998, it nevertheless indicated severe imbalances in productive output.9 Had Ter Petrosyan been the head of a large, economically advanced country, his government perhaps could have relied on various instruments of foreign policy to alleviate the domestic economic and political pressures. The republic, however, is too small and too weak to exert any significant influence through bilateral relations, not to mention on the world political economy.

In the area of foreign policy, the crisis in Karabagh dominated Ter Petrosyan’s national agenda, with enormous ramifications for his government’s political legitimacy and economic performance. As a result of the Karabagh conflict, Baku and Ankara imposed an economic blockade on Karabagh and Armenia, nearly strangulating both. For years Karabagh lacked adequate food supplies, fuel, running water, electricity, sanitation facilities, and communication facilities. According to Helsinki Watch, during the period of its investigation (April 1992), most towns, including Stepanakert, were “at a standstill: no schools, shops, or workplaces operated, food was scarce, and the primary daily activity was fetching water” from twelve springs. Further, because of the conflict, the Ter Petrosyan government had to spend between 10 and 15 percent of the national budget revenues on defense.10 Defense expenditures accounted for 2.2 percent of GDP in 1992 and increased to 4.1 percent in 1995, stabilizing at an average of about 3.5 percent GDP per year before his resignation in 1998.11

In the early stages of the war in Karabagh, each side expected a quick military victory and therefore was less amenable to a negotiated resolution. The Armenian forces registered successes on the battlefield, as in Khojali in March 1992 and the strategically situated town of Shushi in the south in May, which enabled them to secure the Lachin corridor that linked Karabagh and Armenia. Armenian successes led to the downfall of President Ayaz Mutalibov in Baku, who within weeks organized an attempt to regain power but, after failing, fled the country. Abulfaz Elchibey succeeded Mutalibov but was himself forced to resign by a military faction led by Colonel Suret Huseynov in June 1993, followed by the consolidation of power by the former KGB chief in Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev. Although Karabagh forces continued to gain further territory, as in the region of Kelbajar in the north in March 1993, the political reality was that the international community did not extend legal recognition to Karabagh as a sovereign nation-state. On the contrary, in April 1993 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 822 condemning the Armenian offensive in the Kelbajar district and maintained that the said aggression violated the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. Similarly, in July 1993, after the Armenian forces captured the town of Agdam, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 853, repeating its condemnation of Armenian use of force. The Security Council resolutions stressed the need to resolve the conflict through peaceful means.12

By early 1994, because of sheer exhaustion and the enormity of human suffering and bloodshed, both parties agreed to negotiate. The crisis, though far from being resolved, ceased on May 12, 1994, with the signing of the Bishkek Protocol in Kyrgyzstan under Russian auspices. By then, the Armenian-Karabagh forces controlled more than 15 percent of territory within Azerbaijan. The war had claimed more than 20,000 lives and