Материал: Payaslian S., The History of Armenia From the Origins to the Present

Peace of Artashat, relegating the Armenian shahanshah to the position of a symbolic ruler now on friendlier terms with, but serving as a buffer for, Rome against Parthia.86 Under the treaty, Tigran the Great was forced to pay war taxes and to withdraw from Syria, Phoenicia, Mesopotamia, Cilicia, Commagene, and Dsopk. His domain remained limited to Greater Armenia proper until his death in 55 B.C. at the age of eighty-five.87 The Treaty of Artashat signified the decline of the Artashesian empire, not unlike the Treaty of Apamea in 188 B.C., which had signaled the decline of the Seleucids.

Beginning in 54 B.C., Rome intensified its policy toward Armenia, the Middle East, and Parthia. Although Parthian leaders at first sought to strengthen relations with Armenia against Rome and expected cultural ties to draw Armenia closer to them, Phraates III and Pompey arrived at an understanding: In return for Parthian support in Armenia, Pompey would restore the provinces of Corduene and Adiabene, lands annexed by Tigran, to Parthia.88 Although the new Armenian king, Artavazd II (r. 55–35 B.C.), Tigran the Great’s son and successor, preferred to maintain close ties with Rome, that relationship became untenable as Roman and Armenian interests diverged.

In the spring of 54 B.C. the Roman general Marcus Licinius Crassus, notorious for his immense fortunes amassed through both legal and illegal means and now envisioning himself as the conqueror of the East, arrived in Syria with plans to destroy Parthia. It is not clear whether the Roman Consul had approved his Parthian campaign, but he began his military operations across the Euphrates and advanced toward enemy territories, registering victories in successive battles.89 Unwilling to clash with the Roman general head on, early in 53 B.C. the Parthian king Orodes II (r. ca. 57–38 B.C.) dispatched his envoys to meet with Crassus. They found the Roman general in a confident mood, energized with the prospect of gaining land and loot.

In the meantime, the Parthians had invaded Armenia to remove Artavazd’s army as a potential threat. Artavazd rushed to propose that Crassus and his army march across the flat lands of Armenia to launch its attack on Parthia. The Armenian king offered 16,000 cavalry and 30,000 infantrymen as his seal of cooperation in the Roman campaign. Roman military presence in Armenia and Armenian engagement in the offensive, Artavazd reasoned, would provide sufficient defense against further aggression and a potential Parthian counteroffensive. Artavazd must have been aware of the gravity of his gamble in associating himself too closely with Roman military objectives, for Parthian defeat of Crassus would render Armenia vulnerable to greater attacks. Be that as it may, Crassus showed no interest in Artavazd’s plans and ordered his army to march eastward across the Mesopotamian plains into Parthia.90

Disagreements between Artavazd II and Crassus caused frictions between the two and compelled Artavazd to gravitate toward Parthia. This strategic shift in foreign policy came at a time when King Orodes had ordered his army into Armenia to prevent, through negotiation or war, an Artavazd-Crassus alliance. After brief skirmishes, the negotiations between Orodes and Artavazd culminated in the marriage of Artavazd’s sister to the Parthian heir apparent, Bakur (Pacorus). Artavazd continued to hope to remain Rome’s ally as well; Crassus, of course, saw Artavazd’s sudden alignment with Orodes as a treasonous act against Rome but, more personally, against him. The Roman general, however, did not have an opportunity to punish Artavazd. At Artashat, during the festivities celebrating the wedding between Bakur and Artavazd’s sister, as the Armenian and Parthian monarchs and guests were drunk in jollification and merrymaking, a Parthian satrap entered the palace hall and proudly displayed Crassus’s head. At the Battle of Carrhae in 53 B.C., an event of enormous significance for Parthia and, as one historian has commented, “without doubt the most celebrated episode in Parthian history,”91 the Parthian military had captured and decapitated Crassus.92 Plutarch wrote:

Now when the head of Crassus was brought to the king’s door, the tables had been removed, and a tragic actor, Jason by name, of Tralles, was singing that part of the “Bacchae” of Euripides where Agave is about to appear. While he was receiving his applause, Sillaces stood at the door of the banqueting-hall, and after a low obeisance, cast the head of Crassus into the centre of the company. The Parthians lifted it up with clapping of hands and shouts of joy. . . . Then Jason handed his costume of Pentheus to one of the chorus, seized the head of Crassus, and assuming the role of the frenzied Agave, sang these verses through as if inspired:

“We bring from the mountain A tendril fresh-cut to the palace, A wonderful prey.”

Changes in Roman military leadership did not bode well for Armenia, however. Hoping for stability in the region, Artavazd II opted for an equidistant policy toward both Rome and Parthia, but in Rome Julius Caesar decided to renew the military drive against Parthia. While plans were under way to that effect, a civil war broke out in Rome between Caesar and Pompey in 49–48 B.C. and forced Caesar to postpone his eastern campaign. In 47 B.C., having defeated Pompey, Caesar went to Syria and Asia Minor, where his military successes gave occasion to his famous words “Veni, Vidi, Vici” in an address before the Senate.94 Plans were set for Caesar to return to the Middle East and to resume his military operations against Parthia, but a conspiracy in the Roman Senate led to his assassination on March 15, 44 B.C. Undaunted by the loss, the pro-Caesar faction nevertheless relentlessly fought and recaptured power.

Having secured peace at home, the Roman leadership resumed plans for the eastern campaign. General Marc Antony, one of the most prominent pro-Caesar leaders, led the eastern war in Asia Minor and against Parthia. In early 36 B.C., the Roman general demanded full cooperation from Artavazd II in the campaign. The Armenian king vacillated but entered a secret alliance with him and promised to supply 6,000 cavalry and 7,000 infantrymen to accompany the Roman military force of “sixty thousand Roman legionaries, with ten thousand Iberian and Celtic cavalry, and thirty thousand Asiatic allies,” a force far greater than commanded by Crassus two decades earlier.95 Marc Antony, then too engrossed in his love affair with Queen Cleopatra of Egypt, lost much valuable time and did not commence the offensive until summer. Confronting massive resistance on the Euphrates, he entered Armenia, where Artavazd II, faced with no choice, welcomed him. Artavazd advised Antony to avoid further direct confrontation with the Parthian king Phraates IV on the Euphrates and instead to march via Media Atropatene (Azerbaijan). Unfortunately for the Roman general, the advice proved near fatal, as the Parthian army pursued his troops in open field in Atropatene and killed about 10,000 Roman soldiers. The carnage continued until Antony finally escaped from Tabriz. Artavazd II, who now opposed Armenian engagement in the conflict, refused to support him.96

Marc Antony returned to the bosom of Cleopatra to recover, and while in Alexandria he received in 34 B.C. an offer by a delegation from the king of Media, a vassal of Phraates IV, to cooperate in battle against Armenia and Parthia. Antony seized the opportunity to punish Artavazd; the blame for the failure of the Roman army to conquer Parthia, the general believed, rested squarely on the shoulders of Artavazd. In 33 B.C. he attacked Artashat and took Artavazd as hostage to Egypt. Cleopatra ordered the beheading of Aravazd as a demonstration of her love for Marc Antony. Artashes II, Artavazd’s son, escaped to Parthia.97

Despite the reverses suffered during the Roman campaigns, Parthia attempted, albeit briefly, to reestablish its hegemony, and in 30 B.C. supported Artashes II’s return to recapture Armenia. In the process, Artashes II ordered the eradication of all Roman influences as a means to restore Armenia’s autonomy and particularly to avenge Roman invasions there. By this time, based on their experiences with the virulence of Roman hostility toward Armenia, some Armenian leaders preferred to maintain closer alliances with Parthia, a relationship strengthened especially because of the nobility’s familial ties.98 While initially the Romans had presented themselves as “liberators” of the Armenian kingdom against the East, the pro-Parthian nakharars argued, their military engagement had proved far more destructive than any encountered by the local population. The Macedonian invasions in the Near East had given rise to prosperous cities and rapid economic development, while Parthian rule had

proved more lenient toward the subject peoples. The Roman invasions, however, had brought massive physical and cultural destruction.99 Yet, despite Armenian preference for closer ties with Parthia at this time, the Parthian engagement in Armenian affairs ended abruptly. The Parthian military under Phraates IV withdrew from Armenian lands, allowing Rome to exercise exclusive control over the situation in Armenia.100

In 20 B.C. news arrived that the emperor Augustus (r. 27 B.C.–A.D.14) had dispatched his adopted son, Tiberius, and Tigran, the son of Artashes II, to Armenia. The pro-Roman aristocrats seized this opportunity to plead their case to Augustus: Tigran should replace his father, who had shown clear preference for Parthia. The Romans agreed, and a pro-Roman conspiracy orchestrated the assassination of Artashes II and placed Tigran III on the Armenian throne. After Artashes II’s death in 20 B.C., the ensuing domestic conflicts, especially between pro-Rome and pro-Parthia factions, so weakened the Artashesian dynasty that neither the pro-Roman Tigran III nor his son pro-Parthian Tigran IV could muster sufficient power to maintain even a semblance of unity.101

Tigran III (r. 20–6 B.C.) had spent ten years in Rome, where he received his education and political training. Rome supported his accession to the Armenian throne and expected full compliance with its policies in the East. Roman poets composed lyrics praising the imperial military successes in Armenia, while the government minted gold and silver coins celebrating Roman rule over Armenia—Armenia capta and Armenia recapta. The emperor Augustus reportedly commented that Rome could have annexed Armenia after the assassination of Artashes II but the emperor, following precedent, instead preferred to grant the monarchy to its rightful Armenian heir, Tigran. While Tigran III at first supported Roman policy in the region, he gradually shifted his orientation in favor of Parthia, a policy further pursued by his son, Tigran IV (r. 6–1 B.C.).

Tigran IV sought Parthian military support to strengthen his position against pro-Roman families and Rome, but the Parthian monarchy itself was experiencing a turbulent period. In return for his withdrawal from Armenia, Phraates IV had received from Augustus a Roman slave woman, Musa, as a present. Soon thereafter Musa bore a son, Phraataces (diminutive for Phraates), for the king and became Parthia’s queen. In 2 B.C. Musa poisoned her aged husband and placed her son on the Parthian throne. Augustus subsequently ordered his military to conquer Parthia.102 Neither Parthia nor Armenia could withstand the vicissitudes of Roman intrigue and machinations, and by A.D. 10 the Artashesian dynasty had declined beyond repair. Rome ruled Armenia for the rest of the first century A.D.