Материал: Payaslian S., The History of Armenia From the Origins to the Present

KHRUSHCHEV, DE-STALINIZATION,

AND REFORMS, 1953–1964

The new leadership under Nikita Khrushchev sought to disassociate itself from the brutalities committed during Stalin’s rule. The first signs of reforms and a more relaxed political environment for Armenia appeared in 1954, when the Politburo sent Anastas Mikoyan, the leading Armenian official in Moscow, to Erevan to repair relations and remove the Stalinist antinational policies imposed on Armenian cultural activities. Thus, for example, the government made the works of formerly banned authors (e.g., Raffi and Charents) again available to the public.37 This era of reform was formally enunciated by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956. He condemned the excesses of Stalinism and the “cult of personality” and promised to improve political and economic conditions, especially for the agricultural sector.

A number of nascent intellectual movements supported Khrushchev in his efforts toward de-Stalinization. One of the earliest reform-oriented groups emerged at Akademgorodok (Academic City), founded in 1957 at the outskirts of the Russian city of Novosibirsk on the Ob River. Located in western Siberia far from the political centers at Moscow and Leningrad (again St. Petersburg), Akademgorodok served as an intellectual hub for younger artists, scientists, and scholars who, disillusioned with the rigidities of the political system and its ideology of communism, experimented with unorthodox ideas. The principal scholars engaged in the new enterprise included Mikhail Lavrentev, one of the city’s founders, Abel Aganbegyan, and Tatyana Zaslavskaya.38 Khrushchev’s reforms attempted to remove national leaders who were closely associated with Stalinism, but during the next two decades, the Armenian Communist Party under the three successive leaders—Suren Tovmasyan (1953–1960), Iakov Zarobyan (1960–1966), and Anton Kochinyan (1966–1974)—continued to be dominated by the old guard. It should be pointed out, however, that de-Stalinization did not necessarily mean political “liberalization.” The Red Army crushed the Hungarian rebellion during the same year that Khrushchev gave his de-Stalinization speech.39 The Hungarian message could not have escaped the attention of the Armenians in Erevan.

Nor did the Soviet regime relax its onslaught against the Armenian Church and culture, and by the early 1950s, a crisis of profound import developed within the Armenian communities, first between the Mother See of Echmiadzin and the Great House of Cilicia seated at Antelias, Beirut, Lebanon, and then throughout the Armenian communities across the diaspora. The attacks on the intelligentsia in Soviet Armenia were complemented by a renewed propaganda campaign against the Armenian Church at home and in the diasporan communities. The death of Catholicos

Gevorg VI in May 1954 led to the election of Catholicos Vazgen I Baljian in October 1955. Although he improved relations between Soviet Armenia and some sectors in diasporan communities, he was instrumental, with the support of the Soviet authorities and the anti-Dashnaktsutiun parties in the Middle East, in Communist efforts to prevent the election of the next catholicos of Cilicia at Antelias. The Catholicosate of Echmiadzin sought to influence the election in order to enthrone a candidate who would be more amenable to Soviet geopolitical interests. Although in the ensuing political maneuvers and crisis the election, set for February 14, 1956, was at the last minute postponed for a few days, it nevertheless took place on February 20, with the Prelate of Aleppo, Bishop Zareh Payaslian, elevated to the catholicosal throne of the Great House of Cilicia. His ordination took place on September 2, 1956, at the Cathedral of Surb Grigor Lusavorich. The Soviet regime failed, but the crisis deeply divided the diasporan communities along ideological lines between pro-Soviet (Hnchakians and Ramkavars) and anti-Soviet (Dashnaktsutiun) parties.40

By the late 1950s the Armenian economy was beginning to be transformed from agriculture to industrialization and urbanization. In the early 1950s, about 50 percent of the labor force worked in agriculture; by the early 1970s the agricultural sector constituted no more than 20 percent of the labor force. Industrial production increased by an annual average of 9.9 percent, and by the mid-1970s it was “335 times greater than it had been in 1913.”41 The advantages gained in the 1960s did not necessarily improve conditions for the Armenian population, however. The economy still lacked a strong base for consumer economy, misuse of political and economic power led to rampant corruption, and the “second economy”— with all its deleterious implications for the public commonweal—became a permanent fixture.42

At the third session of its Fifth Conference in March 1960, the Supreme Soviet of Armenia paid particular attention to the economic problems. The post-Stalinist environment of reforms encouraged the deputies to criticize openly the various sectors of administration in the republic. As usual, those taking the floor first praised the Communist Party leadership in Erevan and Moscow for their successes in generating economic development in the industrial and agricultural sectors. They then presented a scathing evaluation of the performance of various bureaucracies and of the general economic situation. Addressing the floor, deputy Anton Kochinyan from Eghegnadzor, who a few years later became the leader of the Armenian Communist Party, reminded the chamber of the devastated and poor country the Soviets inherited from the first republic in 1921 and, after praising the Communist Party for its accomplishments since then,43 he complained about the mismanagement and wastefulness of the existing budgetary process. For example, he noted that far too many construction

projects (roads, sewerage, housing, schools) had been launched, and none could receive adequate funding or administrative attention. He noted that even where construction projects received sufficient funding, the inferior quality of workmanship and the unreasonably long duration of construction made such projects doubly expensive. Delays in completion compromised the structural integrity of sections already built, which in turn required additional funds to prevent further deterioration. Despite the huge sums allocated for beautification, the streets in Erevan, Leninakan, and other cities remained filthy, lacked proper maintenance, and in general looked unpleasant. The combination of such problems, he added, not only impeded economic development but also created unsanitary conditions and serious environmental crises in general. Kochinyan concluded his lengthy speech with the recommendation that the local policymakers and administrators institute major reforms so as to generate economic growth in a healthier environment.44 Other deputies echoed his observations. Further, as part of the proposed reforms, some members also advocated the introduction of laws granting citizens the right to recall officials in the local soviets who failed to fulfill their obligations to their constituent communities of workers and farmers. A similar law had been adopted by the Supreme Soviet of Armenia in 1959 for the right to recall deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the republic.45 The political and economic reforms introduced under Khrushchev promised to improve the Soviet system at all levels of government and society. His promises notwithstanding, Khrushchev’s policies, especially in the area of agricultural production, largely failed, and the conservative members of the Politburo ousted him from power in October 1964. The Politburo appointed his protégé, Leonid Brezhnev, party first secretary.

BREZHNEV AND THE CRISIS OF

LEGITIMACY, 1964–1982

Even if Khrushchev’s reforms encouraged greater tolerance for expressions of national aspirations, such activities were confined to the ideological boundaries as determined by the Communist Party leaders in Moscow and Erevan. The Armenian intellectual community tried constantly to keep issues related to the Armenian language, culture, religion, and territories on the national agenda in both capitals. No event showed the revival of Armenian nationalism with greater force than the mass demonstrations in Erevan on April 24, 1965, commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the genocide.46 During the mass demonstrations Armenians demanded the reunification of the historic Armenian territories (occupied by Turkey) with Armenia. While during the April demonstrations Moscow and

Erevan refrained from using military force, the Kremlin soon replaced the Armenian leader, Iakov Zarobyan, by the more “reliable” Kochinyan. The latter insisted on preventing future public outpouring of such “local nationalist” sentiments but permitted the construction of the Genocide Monument at Tsitsernakaberd (Dzidzernagapert), which was completed in November 1967. The Communist government also permitted the construction of the memorial complex dedicated to the Battle of Sardarabad of 1918, which opened in May 1968 on the site of the battleground.47

The Communist Party nevertheless failed to uproot the underground nationalist movements, such as the National Unity Party, which advocated the reunification of Karabagh, Nakhijevan, and Western Armenia with Armenia. In June 1965 thirteen Armenian intellectuals, including the novelist Bagrat Ulubabyan, who served as the head of the Writers’ Union in Karabagh for more than two decades, submitted yet another petition to Moscow calling for the unification of Karabagh with Armenia. Moscow responded by attempting to suppress such demands. In 1966 Armenians intellectuals in Erevan also urged unification; subsequently, Armenians in Karabagh petitioned the government in Erevan to address the matter. The petition enumerated the fundamental grievances against Azerbaijani rule: “Our situation is worse than it has ever been . . . . Our honour is soiled, our dignity and our rights are flouted.” Moscow and Erevan refused to enter negotiations on the matter, and in 1968 violent clashes took place between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Stepanakert.48

Coincidentally, the “Prague Spring” of 1968 in Czechoslovakia and the removal of the reformist Communist Party leader Alexander Dubchek clearly indicated that Moscow would not tolerate deviationism in the Soviet bloc.49 Although some Armenian nationalist leaders were imprisoned and executed, by the middle of the 1970s it was virtually impossible to eliminate all such movements. In 1974 the Kremlin entrusted Karen Demirchyan with the responsibility of addressing local problems, particularly eradication of corruption, reinvigoration of the economy, and control of nationalism.50 In a similar vein, Heydar Aliyev, head of the Communist Party in Azerbaijan, and Boris Gevorgov, an Armenian member of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party, assumed a more direct role in suppressing Armenian demands regarding Karabagh. In a speech at a session of the Regional Committee of Mountainous Karabagh in 1975, Gevorgov accused the Armenian intellectuals engaged in the Karabagh movement as holding “nationalist” sentiments and urged the committee to reject demands for the unification of Karabagh with Armenia as mere “Dashnakist propaganda.”51 Further petitions to the Brezhnev government continued to prove futile, despite Armenian protests.

Armenian nationalism also found expression in anti-Soviet and secessionist movements. Stepan Zatikyan organized the secret National Unity

Party (NUP) in 1967, which emerged in the 1970s as one of the principal nationalist organizations in the Soviet Union. The NUP demanded the reunification of the historic Armenian lands, including Western Armenia, Nakhijevan, and Karabagh. In January 1974 Razmik Zohrapyan, a member of the NUP, burned Lenin’s picture in the Lenin Square (now Republic Square) in Erevan in protest of Soviet totalitarian rule. That year, the Soviet government arrested several NUP members. In January 1977 the group was accessed of setting off a bomb in the Moscow Pervomaiskaia metro station, killing seven people and wounding thirty-seven. The Soviet secret service reportedly foiled plans by the same group for a second explosion at Moscow’s Kursk railroad station in October. The government executed three Armenians (Zatikyan, Hakob Stepanyan, and Zaven Paghtasaryan) accused of the bombing in January and the attempted attack in October. In February 1980 the New Armenian Resistance bombed the Soviet Office of Information in Paris in retaliation.52

Despite its various shortcomings and repressive rule, Soviet Armenia registered significant social and cultural advances. The republic boasted a literacy rate of about 98 percent and 13 institutions of higher education with 57,900 students as well as 1,371 schools with 592,000 students.53 Moreover, a number of literary figures, most prominently the poets Hovannes Shiraz (1915–1984) and Paruyr Sevak (1924–1971), produced enormously popular works and perhaps even shaped the quality of the cultural and political discourse in Armenia and abroad. They struggled to liberate Armenian culture and literature from the dictates of the Communist Party in Moscow and Erevan and to cultivate a more authentic sense of Armenian identity—a worldview that directly clashed with the Kremlin’s ideology of sovietization, de-nationalization, and de-territorialization.54 While Russification and sovietization failed in the republic, Armenian parents, especially among the elite, encouraged their children to master the Russian language so as “to improve the chances of admission to a university in Moscow and Leningrad.”55

In efforts to “modernize” Armenia, the Soviet government sought to remove obstacles in Armenian traditions and customs to the modernization of family structure. Armenian women particularly benefited from the liberalizing effects of educational and employment opportunities. Further, Soviet law demanded mutual consent for marriage, prohibited dowry, and criminalized rape.56 The Soviets also encouraged women, based on the quota system, to hold political office; as a result, by 1990 women made up 30 percent of members in the Armenian Supreme Soviet or parliament. Only a few women, however, gained membership in the Politburo, Ekaterina Furtseva (1957–1961) being the most famous. Modernization and equality in law did not necessarily bring about modernization and equality in local culture and customs. While the Soviet system enabled Armenian women to fuse the responsibilities of employment and motherhood, in fact they continued to shoulder a disproportionately large share of the responsibilities in household labor.