Материал: Payaslian S., The History of Armenia From the Origins to the Present

of the major powers interested in their plight, many Armenian leaders viewed with great trepidation this ostensibly humanitarian engagement in Ottoman affairs on behalf of their nation.5 In February 1914 Rostom (Stepan Zorian), a founding member of the Dashnaktsutiun, in a letter to Simon Vratsian, a prominent member of the party, expressed grave concerns regarding the Ittihadists’ willingness to allow such a fundamental restructuring and the European powers and Russia serving as protectors of the Armenians. Rostom commented prophetically that the reform negotiations under way in Constantinople represented no more than diplomatic theatrics, which could be easily dismissed as irrelevant except for their deleterious consequences for the Armenian people as they could result in a new round of persecutions and massacres.6 Nevertheless, in the middle of 1914, Major Nicolai Hoff of Norway assumed office as the inspector-general at Van, and Louis Westenenk of the Netherlands was expected to arrive at Erzerum soon thereafter.

Perhaps the Young Turk government signed the agreement under German pressure to buy time for certain policy considerations, but the fanatically nationalist Ittihadist regime would not long tolerate such a plan, although initially they concealed their resentment toward foreign intervention.7 Jemal Pasha commented in his memoirs: “Just as it was our chief aim to annul the Capitulations . . ., so in the matter of Armenian reform we desired to release ourselves from the Agreement which Russian pressure had imposed upon us.”8 The Turkish government responded to the combined external and internal challenges by defining the Armenian people within the empire—for decades the beneficiaries of various cultural and commercial ties with foreign institutions—as the principal internal threat. Accordingly, the wartime policy of the Young Turk regime targeted the entire Armenian population.

If Armenians expected the Reform Act of February 8 to lead to administrative and economic reforms to ameliorate their condition, unfolding events soon disillusioned them. The outbreak of World War I certainly dashed all such hopes. On July 28 Austria, with German support, declared war on Serbia, setting in rapid motion the mobilization of forces across Europe. Germany declared war on Russia on August 1 and on France on August 3, followed by a declaration of war by Great Britain on Germany on August 4. On August 2 the Young Turk regime concluded a secret military alliance with Germany against the Entente Powers and commenced general mobilization for the war.9

The war provided the Young Turk government with the opportunity to augment the scope of its Turkification scheme from mere cultural conversion to the physical elimination of its Armenian subjects, although the latter were not the only victims. The Young Turks’ nationalist and religious hostilities toward Christian subjects combined with the economic conditions in general and in the eastern provinces in particular rendered the situation extremely oppressive for the Armenians. When World War I broke out,

the Turkish government and Turkish masses in general vented their collective outrage and nationalist chauvinism against the Armenians, who, the Turks were convinced, had become instruments of foreign subversion conspiring against the Ottoman government but who could not elicit European military support, as demonstrated time and again. The history of the British reaction to the San Stefano treaty and the Russian acquiescence in British demands to revise it at the Berlin conference, in addition to western indifference to the massacres since the 1890s, had amply demonstrated that the major powers directly involved in the regional geopolitical competition and diplomatic endeavors would show no particular concern about the security of the Armenians.10

The Young Turk regime introduced two policies related to the war that also prepared the grounds for the unfolding genocidal scheme: military conscription as mobilization for the war and the abrogation of the Capitulations. As the Turkish government commenced general mobilization for war in late July, the Dashnaktsutiun party convened its Eighth General Congress (July 23–August 2) in the city of Erzerum.11 There the Ittihadist representatives, led by Behaeddin Shakir, the chief of the Teshkilat-i Mahsusa (Special Organization), sought guarantees from the Dashnaktsutiun that, if Turkey entered the war, the party would mobilize Armenians in the Caucasus to rebel against Russia and thereby facilitate Turkish advances across the Russian frontier.12 The Dashnaktsutiun rejected this strategy, instead proposing that Turkey remain neutral. If the country opted for war, however, party leaders maintained, the Armenians in each empire would loyally serve their respective governments.13 The Ittihadists found this response quite unsatisfactory,14 for it implied that a political organization such as the Dashnaktsutiun, with close ties to Russian Armenians, could incite insubordination against the Young Turks at an opportune moment.

MASSACRES AND DEPORTATIONS

Zeitun and Erzerum experienced the initial phase of the physical attacks on the Armenian population. When the seferberlik (mobilization) commenced requiring registration for military service, local Armenian men, fearing wholesale attacks on their families, were reluctant to comply with government orders, although objectors to military service were threatened with death. In the regions of Zeitun, Ali Haidar Bey, the mutessarif (county governor) of Marash, began to mobilize the local Muslims against the Armenians, whom he hated. For nearly a month, the Muslims engaged in a campaign of pillage and destruction. On about August 31, 1914, Haidar Bey arrived at Zeitun with 600 troops to confer with Armenians there. Ostensibly concerned that the refusal by the Armenians

in Zeitun to serve in the military could set a precedent for Armenians in the neighboring towns, the government imprisoned about 50 Armenian leaders.15

At the same time, the province of Erzerum witnessed increasing political repression and economic hardship. Local authorities in Erzerum city arrested two Armenian leaders, E. Aknuni (Khachatur Malumian) and Vahan Minakhorian; Aknuni was exiled to Constantinople, and Minakhorian to Samsun. Moreover, the commerce and economy of Erzerum plummeted into depression, as discriminatory business and taxation policies nearly paralyzed Armenian enterprises, while mounted irregular chete bands (comprised of criminals released from prisons) and Kurdish bands routinely attacked Armenian peasants. If the more superstitious among Armenians were convinced that the darkness brought on them for two minutes by the eclipse of the sun on August 21 foreshadowed a calamitous winter, they certainly could not have imagined the magnitude and gravity of the catastrophe awaiting them.16 Because of the geostrategic significance of the plain of Erzerum, the Ottoman army dispatched a large contingent to the area to defend the frontier against a potential Russian invasion. Soon thereafter about 100,000 Turkish troops were stationed in the region of Erzerum. Additional Turkish military forces moved to Kharpert in preparation for transfer further east, while between 8,000 and 10,000 troops were assembled in Arjesh and the plain of Abagha north of Van. The burden of service and provisions fell mostly on the local Armenian peasants, and at the same time the government commenced search and seizure operations for weapons and army deserters in the Armenian communities. The release of criminals from prisons beginning in October for the express purpose of organizing and arming them only intensified the hostilities. In October and November, under the pretext of searching for weapons and capturing escapees from military service, Turkish soldiers and chete bands pillaged and plundered the villages near Erzerum city. Armenians suspected that the Turkish government required conscription into military service in order to render the Armenian towns and villages defenseless against such attacks.17

On September 10 the Young Turk regime formally notified all foreign embassies of its decision to abrogate the Capitulations on October 1.18 A few days later the Sublime Porte closed the Dardanelles, abrogated the Capitulations on the specified day, entered the war in alliance with Germany on October 30, and issued a proclamation of jihad (holy war) on November 14 against all Christian infidels.19 The unilateral abrogation of the Capitulations signified Turkish nationalist aspirations for independence from foreign intervention. Having disposed of the Capitulations, the Ittihadists also removed any legal pretensions on the part of foreign powers to intervene in the domestic affairs of the empire, a consideration all the

more significant as deportations and massacres were in progress on the eastern frontier of the empire. The Young Turk triumvirate was prepared to eradicate the Armenian Question.

The conscription brought about 1.6 million able-bodied males to military service, leaving behind more than an estimated 1 million families without sources of labor and income and further exacerbating the country’s economic crisis.20 Inflation (in some cases as high as 50 percent), shortage of goods, lack of money, and decline of public confidence in the government’s financial policy had already devastated the economy, with the intricate web of domestic and foreign banking arrangements and commercial investments further complicating the problems. Economic depression coupled with national fanaticism led to repressive measures against foreign institutions and investments. The government also terminated all communications with the outside world, except cipher telegrams for official use.21 The Young Turk leadership, distrustful of Christians, decided to rely on Muslims for the war effort, although, at least according to one source, an estimated 150,000 Armenian soldiers were serving in the military by October.22 Armenian men, first from 20 to 45 years of age and subsequently from 15 to 20 and 45 to 60, were drafted into military service. As the military mobilization for the war gained momentum, the government also mobilized chete bands to attack Armenian towns and villages.23 Rather than allowing them to serve as soldiers, however, the Armenians were disarmed and used in labor battalions to build roads and to haul carts.24

In October 1914 the Turkish 37th Division had moved eastward to reinforce the Turkish army on the Caucasian front. Subsequent military offensives and counteroffensives by Russian and Turkish forces across the region heightened the physical vulnerability of the Armenian inhabitants. Russian military strategists believed that the Ottoman Third Army stationed in Erzerum and led by General Hasan Izzet Pasha would lack sufficient capability to launch an effective offensive against Kars and beyond. Izzet Pasha, for his part, also considered his army incapable of a significant offensive, but he also estimated that the Russian troops were not prepared to mount a sustainable defense.25 His assessment appeared deceptively accurate, for after an initial advance toward Erzerum in mid-December 1914, the Russian army withdrew from the region. Turkish troops reacted by attacking the Armenians in a number of villages and forcing them out of their houses, as in Dzitogh, located about fifteen miles north of Erzerum.26 Further, sporadic attacks against Armenians increased in frequency beginning in early November 1914 in Sivas province, as in the region of Shabin-Karahisar, and spread to Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, and Kharpert. As the government prepared for further confrontations on the Russo-Turkish front, it issued an imperial rescript on December 16, 1914, that nullified the Reform Act of

February 8.27 “We live on a volcano,” commented the Danish missionary Maria Jacobsen in her diary.28

In Van city, local prominent Armenians, such as Aram Manukian (Sergei Hovhannisian, 1879–1919), one of the principal Dashnakist leaders there, sought to calm the public—Armenian and Turk alike—through negotiations with the governor. The futility of such efforts became apparent when, in November, the Armenians across the province, from Adiljavaz (Adiljevaz, Aljavaz) and Arjesh on the northern shores of Lake Van, to Gevash (Gavash) and Karjkan (Garjgan) on the southern shores, to the valley of Hayots Dzor south of Van city, and as far south as Shatakh, became the targets of escalating government repression, searches for weapons and for deserters, and official and unofficial extortions. The ensuing clashes between the Turkish military and the Armenians dissipated any hopes for peace and security.29

In early November the Turkish forces under Izzet Pasha stationed near the Arax River were ordered to move against the Russian army and were successful in their advance for most of the month. Despite the harsh weather in December, Minister of War Enver launched his Sarikamish campaign, a major offensive against Russia. Referred to as Napoleonlik (Little Napoleon) because of his grandiose schemes in imitation of the great strategist and emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, Enver led an army of about 95,000 troops against the Russian force of 65,000 troops on the Caucasus front. The Sarikamish battle was fought on December 29, 1914; after initial successes, Enver’s military offensive ended in total disaster. The Turkish divisions were annihilated during the first week of January 1915, and by the middle of the month no more than 18,000 had survived. The Russian army figures totaled 16,000 killed and wounded. Enver’s inadequate logistical preparation, the perilous conditions of winter, and Russian military strategy destroyed the Turkish forces. Enver returned to Constantinople having suffered a humiliating military defeat.30

Back in the capital, Enver praised the loyalty and bravery of the Ottoman Armenian soldiers during his failed campaign.31 He intimated to Patriarch Zaven Der Yeghiayan that “had it not been for an unauthorized maneuver executed by a certain Sergeant Major Hovhannes, he would have been taken captive.” Enver “promoted Hovhannes to the rank of Captain on the spot.”32 Enver attempted but failed to conceal the humiliating truth about his military fiasco at Sarikamish. Soon thereafter rumors spread that an opposition clique, most likely led by Jemal Pasha, conspired to remove him from power. Jemal was known for his opposition to Enver’s close ties with the German military, and as the pro-German faction led by Enver consolidated power in the military, Jemal was in November 1914 appointed commander of the Ottoman Fourth Army centered at Damascus with the objective of removing the British from Egypt.33