Материал: Payaslian S., The History of Armenia From the Origins to the Present

farther north (from 961 to 1081); the kingdom of Lori, north of Lake Sevan (from 966 to 1100); and the kingdom of Siunik, southeast of Lake Sevan (from 966 to 1166). After nearly four centuries since the last independent Armenian monarchy collapsed in 428, the Bagratuni house, with great political skill and at times sheer luck amid turmoil and triumphs, revived the Armenian kingdom.

ASHOT I

Ashot I (r. 885–890) began his reign at a time when local conflicts among nakharars competing for power and wealth had destabilized the entire Armenian Plateau. With the support of the military, Ashot consolidated his rule over vast territories as he cajoled and coerced his followers and opponents to stabilize his dominion and assumed authority in managing the governmental apparatus and functions of administration, such as taxation, while the ostikan, or governor, of Arminiya served as overseer at Dvin.

Ashot’s reign strengthened the monarchy through various networks of alliances but failed, largely because of its short duration, to create a united Armenian state with full sovereignty.3 While the Bagratunis emerged as the principal nakharar house buttressed by the caliphate in Baghdad, the other nakharar families found it politically expedient— particularly since familial ties were involved—to cooperate with Ashot I when necessary. Three of Ashot’s daughters had married into the leading nakharar houses: Sopi married the Artstruni prince GrigorDerenik at Vaspurakan; Mariam married the Siunik lord Vasak Gabur; and another daughter married the Bagratuni prince Guaram at Kgharjk.4

Opposition to Bagratuni rule began to take shape in regions beyond Ashot’s immediate control and coalesced around several issues that proved intractable. Of central import was the problem of political legitimacy, as the rise of the Bagratunis to the status of monarchy created a new configuration of power relations among the nakharar houses. Some of them, including the Siunik and Artsruni houses, despite their familial ties, only reluctantly accepted the legitimacy of the Bagratuni kingdom. They claimed that the Bagratunis had served as coronants during the Artashesian and Arshakuni eras and that while they rightly held these esteemed offices, they should not have arrogated to themselves the right to crown Bagratunis.5 Having attained the status of royalty, the Bagratunis for their part expected the other nakharar houses to support them loyally, an expectation that clashed with Artsruni and Siunik political aspirations. Moreover, in order to strengthen their position, the Bagratuni leaders initially relied

heavily on patronage and distributed privileges of vassalage in the form of estates (gavars) and honorary titles to members of their own dynasty, exacerbating the growing tensions among the nakharar houses.6 Ashot I died in 890, and his death led to further deterioration in the Armenian polity.

The Bagratunis had little choice in determining the form of their government. Rather than inherit stable social and political structures with clearly delineated territorial boundaries and administrative jurisdiction, they confronted a political system embroiled in turmoil. Even after Ashot I consolidated power with the support of the church and some of the nobles, for strategic reasons he continued to rule from Bagaran, his power base, rather than transfer his court to Dvin, the administrative capital under the later Arshakunis.7 Ashot could not immediately achieve a high degree of centralization of power and instead opted for a loosely organized union of princely states, a “feudal confederation,” whereby the administration of affairs would be based on cooperation among functionally parallel offices in each region. The feudal lords of nakharar houses and officials thus retained their local autonomy and institutional prerogatives. Privileges derived from patronage, the traditional system of rewards and punishment, served as the cement for political order and unity. In cases when a nakharar leader violated the uhkt (oath of allegiance) and treaties of union—as in 903 when Prince Ashot of Siunik rejected the supremacy of the Bagratuni king Smbat I—the monarch retaliated by formally nullifying the prince’s privileges of vassalage, including his rights to estates and honorary titles.8

SMBAT I

The reign of Smbat I (r. 890–914), Ashot I’s son, proved to be a combination of successes and failures, as the new monarch struggled to balance domestic and external pressures. That his own uncle (Ashot’s brother), Abas Bagratuni, the sparapet (commander of the army), schemed against Smbat’s accession to the throne did not augur well. Smbat formally secured the Bagratuni throne in 890, when the caliphate sent a crown, delivered by none other than the emir (governor) of the caliph’s vassal state in Azerbaijan, Muhammad Afshin of the Muslim Sajid dynasty. Following his father’s pro-Byzantium policy, however, Smbat I preferred closer ties with the emperor Leo VI in hopes of securing total independence from the caliphate. The bilateral treaty signed by Smbat and Leo in 893 contributed to the economic growth of Armenia and further integrated the Bagratuni finances into the regional economy.9 It was Smbat’s misfortune that while the treaty signified amicable relations, it did not guarantee military support. Abas Bagratuni posed the first domestic challenge to Smbat’s rule in

part because he coveted the throne but also because he disagreed with his nephew’s pro-Byzantine leanings. Before the conflict escalated into a seriously destabilizing affair, Catholicos Gevorg Garnetsi, as the supreme patriarch of the Armenian Church, intervened.

The principal foreign threat to Smbat’s rule involved Muhammad Afshin, who sought to expand his domain under a unified ArmenoAzerbaijani military administrative system. Ostikan Muhammad Afshin had been appointed emir of Azerbaijan in 889/890, and although he had maintained good relations with the Bagratunis, shifting winds in Baghdad’s foreign policy objectives, particularly in response to Smbat’s commercial agreement of 893 with Byzantium, elicited an aggressive posturing toward the Armenian lands. As Muhammad Afshin prepared to invade Armenia, Smbat reacted with a two-pronged policy: He dispatched envoys to confer with Muhammad Afshin in hopes of preventing a conflict, while ordering a military force of an estimated 30,000 troops to halt an invasion. The governor of Azerbaijan called off the operation and met with Smbat to strengthen their old relations, although the Armenian king nevertheless continued to seek closer alliance with Leo VI.10

Smbat I cultivated peaceful relations with Muhammad Afshin so as to encourage Muslim merchants to travel through Armenia en route to Byzantium and to enrich Armenia’s coffers. Trade between Byzantium and the Orient as facilitated by the “economic buffer” territories within Smbat I’s domain contributed to the rapid local economic and urban development during this period. The enormous wealth accumulated by the ruling elite through international trade enabled them to build and adorn churches and palaces.11

Pockets of recurring crises, however, diverted energy and resources from the monarchy. In Vaspurakan, for example, local Artsruni lords SargisAshot and Gagik Abumervan, nephews of Smbat I, contended for land and power. Smbat I favored Abumervan, causing Sargis-Ashot to solicit Muhammad Afshin’s support against both. Negotiations led to the agreement that Muhammad Afshin would grant a crown to Sargis-Ashot, and the latter in turn would cooperate against Smbat. In the meantime, Ahmad Shaybani, the son of the Mesopotamian emir Issa ibn Shaikh, conquered the cities of Amid (Amida; Diarbekir) and Taron in 895. What followed after the battle for Taron must have amused Muhammad Afshin and military strategists in Baghdad and Constantinople. Shaybani gained control over Taron in part because of the support by the local opponents of Gagik Abumervan. King Smbat I, not willing so easily to lose the strategically important town in the southern flank of his domain, mobilized a force of 60,000 men to liberate Taron. Gagik Abumervan at first pretended to join Smbat’s forces against Shaybani but suddenly defected and led his troops to the village of Tukh on the western shores of Lake Van, expecting to join

forces with Shaybani. The latter, apparently informed of Abumervan’s approaching army, had readied his troops and caught Abumervan by surprise. Shaybani’s forces decimated the units under Abumervan, while those led by Smbat I deserted in large numbers. By the time the war ended, the Armenian military had lost 5,000 men, including Abumervan.12

Muhammad Afshin welcomed with a great sense of relief the news of the military disasters suffered by the Armenians at the hands of Shaybani. In preparation for another invasion of Armenia, Muhammad Afshin in 898 invited his erstwhile ally Sargis-Ashot to join in the campaign. SargisAshot at first appeared ready for the task, but Smbat I interceded and convinced the lord of Vaspurakan to abandon the plan. The rewards for cooperation with Smbat seemed to outweigh the advantages sought in collusion with Muhammad Afshin at least for one obvious reason: SargisAshot’s principal competitor, Gagik Abumervan, was dead, and he, the leading Artsruni in Vaspurakan, could finally rule as the sole prince of Vaspurakan.13

When Muhammad Afshin launched the invasion from the northnortheast, Smbat I’s army, recovering from the devastation sustained in the south, was hardly in a position to withstand another onslaught. Muhammad Afshin attacked Dvin, forcing Smbat I, the royal family, and the entire royal entourage to flee the capital in total chaos. After sacking Dvin, Muhammad Afshin’s forces marched on Kars, where the Armenian queen had sought refuge with the royal treasury and several women from other nakharar families. The ensuing negotiations between Muhammad Afshin and Smbat I led to a peace treaty which required that the Armenian king, now relegated to a subordinate status, pay heavy taxes as well as send his son and heir apparent, Ashot, and his nephew Smbat as hostages to the court of the emir of Azerbaijan. He was also required to marry his niece to Muhammad Afshin. However, Muhammad Afshin died in 898 and did not enjoy the fruits of his victory.14 Thus ended a period of turbulence and tribulations for the Bagratuni monarchy.

Nearly eight years of invasions and instability had diminished King Smbat I’s less-than-enviable capabilities to defend his dominion. If Armenians welcomed Muhammad Afshin’s death and expected stability in the region, they were soon to be disabused, for his brother, Yusuf ibn Abu Saj Devdad, the ostikan from 901 to 919 and 922 to 929, resumed his predecessor’s aggressive policy. Yusuf planned to establish his own rule with greater autonomy and even total independence from Baghdad. When Caliph Ali al-Muktafi (r. 902–908) refused to entertain such notions of decentralization, Yusuf nevertheless pressed forward and invaded Smbat I’s lands. Negotiations in 903 led to an unequal armistice, whereby in return for peace Yusuf demanded recognition of the supremacy of his rule and payment of tribute directly to him in addition to the taxes paid to Baghdad.

The Smbat-Yusuf armistice permitted several years of peace and stability, but its provisions weighed heavily on Armenian finances. Smbat I required that the nobles contribute to the tribute by surrendering one-fifth of their wealth. The nobles, finding the imposition quite unacceptable, responded by plotting to oust the king. The attempt failed largely because internal conflicts among the nakharar houses prevented a united front.15

Yusuf, himself gambling for regional supremacy, was hardly in a more magnanimous mood. Taking advantage of the weakened leadership in Baghdad under the new caliph Zafar al-Muktadir (r. 908–932), he began yet again to mobilize his forces against Armenia. In 908, Yusuf crowned Gagik Artsruni king of Vaspurakan and “King of All Armenians” (Tagavor Amenayn Hayots), and their combined armies invaded Bagratuni Armenia. Smbat sent Catholicos Hovhannes to negotiate a settlement with Yusuf, but to no avail. In fact, Yusuf held the catholicos hostage and in chains at Dvin. Smbat’s urgent calls for assistance from the Byzantine military leaders in Constantinople and the caliph in Baghdad proved equally fruitless.16

The joint Yusuf-Artsruni military campaign against Smbat and across Armenia escalated in the summer of 909, as the Bagratuni monarch sought refuge from fort to fort. Members of other anti-Yusuf dynasties also fled their homes—for example, Prince Vasak of Gegharkunik in Siunik escaped with his brother Sahak and mother Mariam (the daughter of Ashot I).17 Yusuf remained in control of Dvin during the winter and resumed the war in the spring of 910. In light of the sheer impotence of Smbat’s military, Yusuf deemed it sufficient to rely on native forces under the command of King Gagik I Artsruni rather than engage his own troops. The war dragged on intermittently for the next three years. Smbat’s military had disintegrated by early 914 as a result of death and desertion. He eventually surrendered and was beheaded on Yusuf’s orders in Dvin. Smbat’s death followed by persecutions, executions, forced conversions of Armenians to Islam, and overall destruction of agriculture and economy. The nakharars and the Armenian leaders in general reacted by efforts to reassert Armenian dominance and to reunify the country; accordingly, they supported Smbat I’s son, Ashot II, as the new king.18

The question as to whether Gagik I Artsruni would support Armenian reunification or continue his alliance with Yusuf remained suspended in the balance. His support for Ashot II would be essential to bring forth a modicum of unity. In fact, while Smbat’s military strength rapidly disintegrated beginning in 912, Gagik Artsruni, with sufficient self-confidence if not an exaggerated sense of self-importance, had contemplated shifting alliances against Yusuf, for, he had reasoned, the elimination of Smbat could provide him, as the King of All Armenians, the power and authority to rule all of Armenia from Vaspurakan independently of Yusuf. Gagik also expected, however, that Yusuf would turn against him immediately