Дипломная работа: Defense and foreign policies of the global and regional actors in middle east and north Africa and its impact on the Eu’s turbulence: the cases of Syria and Yemen in 2011-2017

2. Tehran may have supplied Russian and Iranian antitank guided missiles. CAR found nine Russian-made 9M133-1 Kornet ATGMs manufactured in two production lots in 2008; the Kornet is a common weapon in Iran's arsenal. The UAE showed CAR a similar Russian-made Kornet reportedly captured from the Houthis in Taizz on November 29, 2015. The serial number on the latter weapon placed it in the same production batch (Lot 02-08) as the Kornets, providing a potential “smoking gun” linking Iranian smuggling vessels with frontline Houthi fighters. In addition, the UAE's Taizz cache included a 2015 Iranian-made Dehlavieh ATGM (an Iranian copy of the Kornet), while the Oman cache included an Iranian-made Tosan ATGM (Iran's copy of the 9M113 Konkurs).

It means Iran prefers do not support the Houthis openly but provide them with weapons and other material support as forms of unconventional security policy.

2.4 Pragmatic approach for policy Cycle in Yemen

The war in Yemen has left at least 10,000 dead, including almost 4,000 civilians, according to the United Nations, and has displaced 3.2 million Yemenis, out of a population of 27 million. It has decimated the economy of what was already the poorest country in the Arab world and sparked a deadly famine. Yemen's infrastructure is in ruins. Saudi Arabia's official reason for continuing its assault on its impoverished southern neighbor is to restore the legitimate president of the country, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Hadi fled the capital, Sanaa, in February 2015 and now stays in Saudi Arabia. But Saudi Arabia accuses Iran of backing the Houthis, and the war in Yemen is often cast as a proxy battle between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Houthis and Iranians are both Shiites, though the Houthis are Zaydis, a different branch of Shiite Islam than is practiced by Iranian leadership. Indeed, the Iranian government did work to increase its influence in Yemen after the change in Yemeni leadership in 2012 by supporting activists who were against Hadi's government. Saudi Arabia was keenly aware of such developments, and the monarchy, fearful of Shiite Islam as it is, did not want Iran to gain any more allies in the region, especially not on its southern border.

After general identification of the problem we should detail it and then we will find two crucial challenges:

1. Problem of macrolevel - the battle of power where regional powers use conventional and irregular forces for reshaping economic and security architecture in Middle East that costs more than 10,000 lives.

2. Problem of microlevel - state fragility and economic collapse of Yemen as a result of the revolution, civil war and foreign intervention.

What is the similarity of these problems? For Yemeni case we can say that state fragility of the country has clear connection with fiasco of democracy transition when global powers use it for the contestation of reshaping regional economic and security order. In other words, we can describe hybrid warfare here as a tool of dominance in the context of Realpolitik's paradigm or pragmatic approach of Philippe Zittoun, if we will analyze security policies and decision process of major actorsin the context of “cognitive bricolage”. On the one hand, we have policy cycle of state transition with its steps, on the other hand, there is hybrid warfare as the most efficient source of war.

Figure 3

On the scheme there are key regional actors for Middle East and North Africa that show us global context for Yemeni proxy war between KSA and Iran. For local level of the country we have two opposing blocks:

· Yemeni government with support of coalition lead by Saudi Arabia (Sunni group)

· Insurgents (the Houthis) with support of Iran (Shia group).

In terms of proxy warfare, Iran and KSA are benefactors, the Houthis and Yemeni government are conduits. Tensions are high between Huthis and their various opponents - the Ahmar family, Major General AliMohsen al-Ahmar (no relation to the Ahmar family) and his military allies, Salafifighters, and the Sunni Islamist party, Islah, and their affiliated tribes.

Huthis claim that their expansion is locally driven. Yemenis, they say, welcomethem because they are frustrated with old regime forces, including the Salehs, AliMohsen, Islah and the Ahmars.Opponents contrast the Huthis' inclusive rhetoric with their often repressive tactics. Critics routinely accuse the group of wanting to reinstate, by force, a theocracysimilar to the Zaydi imamate of Yemen's past. Some go further, claiming that theHuthis have turned away from their Zaydi roots toward Twelver Shiism - to whichIran's Shiites adhere - and are serving Tehran's agenda.

Thus, for external actors - Iran and KSA - there are another interests:

Table 3

Methodologically, there is collaboration between tri-partite counter insurgency model of Andrew Mumford and actors-centered approach of Dmitry Zaytsev. Mumford gives three interactive and interdependent factors in the model: the counter-insurgent, the insurgent and the international political context. Particularly, Mumford does not associate here the insurgent/counter-insurgent with actors that are specific implications of rebels' groups and can occur spontaneously. Zaytsev have the same idea about nature of actor. “Spontaneous groups of citizens to political change, except giving a signal about their necessity, are not affected. On the contrary, agents, actors, and especially strategic actors influence the political changes (agents for the benefit of their patrons, the actors themselves in their own interests). Rare cases when spontaneous not institutionalized groups of citizens are transformed strategic actors (such as the "Solidarity" movement in Poland or "S№jыdis" in Lithuania). The most common when mass protest remain spontaneous expression of discontent of citizens, which is suppressed by the old or take dictation of a new political elite (e.g. case of “Arab Spring” show us). In theory, there are several strategies of action of spontaneous not institutionalized groups of citizens transformed into strategic actors - growing “out of itself” the new political elite or the creation of policy coalitions to develop and promote alternative policies”Zaytsev, Dmitry. Positioning Actors Centered Approach Within and Vis-а-Vis Paradigms, Methodological Frameworks and Methods of Social Sciences, 7-th ECPR General Conference Science Po Bordeaux, 4-7 September 2013 (Bordeaux)..

2.5 Policy recommendations

Nowadays, we see ongoing war in Yemen and the main alternative to this bloody conflict is “political solution”, in according to UNSCR 2342 (2017). The situation is combustible. Emboldened by recent victories, the Huthis mayoverplay their hand and miss a chance to consolidate gains through compromise.Their opponents, who show no sign of giving in, are pushing state intervention to rollback Huthi advances. President Abdo Robo Mansour Hadi's government is at risk ofbeing pulled into a conflict that it cannot win militarily, especially while it fights anemboldened al-Qaeda branch. Southern separatists also are watching developmentsin the north closely; should the military become embroiled there, they could seizethe opportunity to advance an independence bid.They did not fashion a clear consensus around the issues driving the fighting,such as power sharing and the division of the country into six federal regions. Someelements, like disarmament of non-state actors, are dangerously vague, lacking timetablesand enforcement mechanisms.In April 2014, President Hadi initiated talks with Huthi leader Abd-al-Malik al-Huthi about ending the recent fighting and implementing the NDC. But Hadi andUN Special Envoy Jamal Benomar must go further and transform the NDC conclusionsinto an implementable peace deal. The talks must include, at least informally,additional stakeholders: high-level representatives of the General People's Congress(GPC, former President Saleh's party), Islah, the Ahmars, Ali Mohsen and Salafis.

Any realistic peace plan will need to satisfy the core concerns of belligerents and guarantee them with enforcement mechanisms. Three elements are critical:

1.National and local power sharing until elections can be held. This should include a consensus government that would ideally comprise Huthi representatives, with ministers chosen on the basis of professional skill and political affiliation.

2. Disarmament. The Huthis should agree to a detailed, sequenced program for transferringweapons to the state in exchange for government steps to improve its neutrality, especially of the security services. Disarmament, first of heavy andthen medium weaponry, must apply to all non-state actors. To promote transparencyand implementation, all sides could agree to a monitoring framework.

3. Guarantees of freedom of religious belief and peaceful political activities. As a first step, the Ahmars, Islah, Salafis and Ali Mohsen should explicitly accept the Huthis' right to propagate their religious views and pursue peaceful political activities. The Huthis should do the same for others and form a political party. Negotiating the details and sequencing of implementation are far from easy. The parties were unable to do so during the NDC, which succeeded in no small part because difficult decisions were delayed. Yemen no longer has this luxury. At stake is not only a relapse into violence, but the country's fragile transition.

Figure 4

Figure 5

On scales of the victims and destructions, catastrophic social, economic and political consequences such conflicts of new type are comparable with consequences of the most real war.

And «rules of war» significantly have changed. The role of not military ways has increased in achievement of political and strategic objectives which in some cases have considerably surpassed weapon force in the efficiency.

The focus of the used methods of confrontation is shifted towards broad application of the political, economic, information, humanitarian and other not military measures realized with involvement of protest potential of the population. All this is complemented with military measures of the hidden character, including realization of actions of information confrontation and actions of forces of special operations. Often under the guise of peacekeeping activity and crisis settlement pass to open use of force only at some stage, generally for achievement of final success in the conflict.

From here natural questions follow: what is modern war, what it is necessary to prepare army for, than she has to be armed? Only having answered them, we will be able to define the directions of construction and development of Armed Forces for a long-term outlook. For this purpose it is necessary to represent accurately what forms and ways of their application we will use?

Now along with traditional non-standard receptions take root. The role of mobile trans-species groups of the troops acting in uniform prospecting information space due to use of new opportunities of control systems and providing raises. Military operations become more dynamic, active and productive. Tactical and operational pauses which the opponent could use disappear. New information technologies have allowed to reduce considerably a spatial, time and information gap between troops and governing bodies. Frontal collisions of large groups of troops (forces) at the strategic and operational level gradually consign to the past. Remote contactless impact on the opponent becomes the main way of achievement of the goals of fight and operation. Defeat of his objects is carried out on all depth of the territory. Differences between strategic, operational and tactical level, offensive and defensive actions are erased. Use of precision weapons gains mass character. Actively take root arms on the new physical principles into military science and robotic systems.

The asymmetric actions allowing to level superiority of the opponent in armed struggle were widely adopted. Treat them use of forces of special operations and internal opposition for creation of the permanent front in all territory of the resisting state and also information influence which forms and ways are constantly improved. The happening changes find reflection in doctrinal views of the leading countries of the world and are approved by different global and regional actors.

For example, by the end of April 2018 two agreements on accession to the mode of cessation of hostilities of settlements of ANHUL of the province Derja and NABA AL FAVOR of the Province of El-Cuneytrawere signed.

The number of the settlements which have joined reconciliation process has increased till 1475.Negotiations on accession to the mode of cessation of hostilities with groups of the armed opposition in the provinces of Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and El-Cuneytra are continued.

The number of the paramilitary groups which have declared the commitment to acceptance and performance of conditions of cessation of hostilities according to the armistice agreement of February 27, 2016 hasn't changed - 143.The number of the settlements freed since January 1, 2017 by the Syrian government troops from paramilitary groups of the international terrorist organization "Islamic State" hasn't changed - 236.Per day under control of government troops has passed 16 sq.km of the territory. 4629 sq.km. are in total released. Observance of the mode of cessation of hostilities

From 00:00 on December 30, 2016 according to the Uniform Agreement on complex permission of the Syrian crisis the regime of cessation of hostilities is introduced. The number of the paramilitary groups of the Syrian opposition which have joined the mode of cessation of hostilities hasn't changed - 65.The Russian part of representative office of the joint Russian-Turkish commission on consideration of the questions connected with violations of the Uniform Agreement has recorded per day 15 violations in provinces Damascuses (9), Latakia (3), Hama (2) and Derja (1).Turkish part of representation has recorded 12 violations of the Uniform Agreement in the provinces of Aleppo (5), Damascus (2), by Derja (2), Hama (2), Homs (1).

During trial on these facts of violations it is established that all 12 cases of violations aren't confirmed by the Russian side

3. Migration risks and turbulence of the European Union: the role of borders management, third country nationals and legal implications

The international migration turned into a universal problem long years ago, and the EU is not an exception. There were more than 16,2 million citizens from the third countries before the refugee crisis in the EU who lived on the legal basis, i.e. about 4% of population of the member-statesD. von Hoffmann (ed.). Towards a Common European Immigration Policy. Frankfurt am Main, 2003. Р. 11-32. Also, see more about the phenomenon of international migration in KoserKh. International migration. A Very Short Introduction. Oxford, 2007. Also, some issues of the EU border control were mentioned by Steve Peers in the Chapter 25 in International Migration Law: Developing Paradigms and Key Challenges / edited by Ryszard Cholewinski, Richard Perruchoud, Euan MacDonald, The Hague: TMC Asser, 2007..

The problem of cross-border migration has many sides. Along with positive moments (for example, inflow of necessary cheap labour force), it contains also a row negative elements (in particular, connected with organised crime and terrorism). It puts the EU before dificult problem of development of an adequate legal mechanism of regulation for migration flows. Not accidentally this mechanism is non-uniform and represents a difficult interlacing of elements of the common international law, the EU law and national law of the member-states.

Moreover, current migration flows and processes have a very strong impact on the idea and foundations of the European Union and its policies. We can see evolution of different concepts of state, stateness and statehood and interpenetration of foreign and internal policy. The global crisis of sovereignty and legitimacy need in rethink of traditional views on the problems of state.

3.1 Legal mechanismsof the migration policy

Originally the basis of this mechanism was made by the Schengen agreements - The Schengen acquis - Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders of June 19, 1985 EUR-Lex: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:42000A0922(01) (Schengen I) and Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders of June 19, 1990 EUR-Lex: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:42000A0922(02) (Schengen II). In the same period - June 15, 1990 was signed the Dublin Convention that contained the system of criteria according to which the member-states admit for consideration of petitions from asylum seekers. Along with the Schengen agreements it was the tool for more close cooperation by implementation of joint actions of police officers, judicial, customs and other competent authorities of the EU member-states. The area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) is an important link between the Schengen law and the law of the European Union.

Further development of legal infrastructure of AFSJ on a basis of the Treaty of Amsterdam was concretised at a meeting of the European Council in Tampere, Finland in October, 1999 (Tampere I): «This freedom should not, however, be regarded as the exclusive preserve of the Union's own citizens. Its very existence acts as a draw to many others world-wide who cannot enjoy the freedom Union citizens take for granted. It would be in contradiction with Europe's traditions to deny such freedom to those whose circumstances lead them justifiably to seek access to our territory. This in turn requires the Union to develop common policies on asylum and immigration, while taking into account the need for a consistent control of external borders to stop illegal immigration and to combat those who organise it and commit related international crimes. These common policies must be based on principles which are both clear to our own citizens and also offer guarantees to those who seek protection in or access to the European Union» Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm#union.. The meeting was devoted to development of the general immigrant policy and granting asylum in the EU for five-year term. In December, 2004 the EU adopted the second five-year programme (The Hague Programme, or Tampere II). This programmeactually developed provisions of previous conclusions. Particularly, the need of improvement of cooperation between judicial and law-enforcement bodies of the member-states, creation of common asylum system, regulation of legal immigration, distributions of a financial burden between the member-states and the EU protecting external borders, fighting against illegal immigration, international terrrorism and cross-border organised crime.

All these measures for development of a legal mechanism of AFSJ did not affect the special status of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, when carrying out the common migration policy of the EU. According to the special protocols to the Treaty of Amsterdam these countries stipulated for themselves a possibility of non-participation in Schengen processesSo called «opt-in» and «opt-out» - Protocol (No 19) on the Schengen Acquis Integrated into the Framework

of the European Union:

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012E%2FPRO%2F19. There is a case С-77/05 UK & Ireland v. Council (2007) where we can find a legal position of the Court of Justice that non-participation of a member-state in any coverage of the EU law is deprived by this member-state of the right to take part in development of the acts of the secondary law concerning this sphere, even if this state is interested in development of the similar act.. The United Kingdom and Ireland agreed to support measures for protection of external borders of the EU and to participate in cooperation of law-enforcement bodies and judicial authorities of the member-states, but refused to open the internal borders. Denmark limited the participation only to international legal obligations within the Schengen agreements. In practice it meant that approved by this country in 6 months measures of the European Council, taken on a basis of the Schengen acquis, obliged only member-states which participated in this measure. The same legal regime concerning the Schengen acquis extends to other countries of the Nordic Council: for the EU member-states (Sweden, Finland) and non member-states (Iceland, Norway).

The Treaty of Lisbon which came into force on December 1, 2009 did not bring something cardinally new to the mechanism of regulation of freedom of movement for citizens of the third countries in the territory of the EU, especially as its basis draw up by statements of the secondary law of the EU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Title V “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”. The provisions of this title often reproduce (if not literally, but in fact) provisions of the acts of the secondary law of the EU, regulating position of citizens of the third countries in the EU, in particular the concerning lawful stay and stay of citizens of the third countries in the EU, fighting against illegal migration, terrorism and cross-border crimes, protection of basic rights and personal freedoms.. In this regard in the Protocol 36 to the Treaty of Lisbon on transitional provision it is emphasized that the acts of bodies and institutes of the EU adopted before entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon will continue to work until they are not cancelled, cancelled or changed in the course of application of agreements (Art. 9 of the Protocol).